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**SAVREMENA  
POLITIKA  
I UPRAVLJANJE**

**Časopis teorijskih i primenjenih političkih nauka  
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**SAVREMENA POLITIKA I UPRAVLJANJE**  
Časopis teorijskih i primenjenih političkih nauka  
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*Glavni urednik:* prof. dr Veran Stančetić

*Odgovorni urednik:* dr Srđan M. Jovanović

*Redakcija:*

Dr Srđan M. Jovanović [Centar za studije dobrog upravljanja, Beograd]

Doc. dr Vladimir Pavićević [Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd]

Prof. dr Veran Stančetić [Fakultet za evropske pravno-političke studije, Novi Sad, Univerzitet Edukoms/ Centar za studije dobrog upravljanja, Beograd]

Prof. dr Zoltan Vig [Fakultet za ekonomiju, finansije i administraciju, Beograd, Univerzitet Singidunum]

Dr Nenad M. Ilić [Centar za studije dobrog upravljanja, Beograd / Zadruga dobrih domaćina Srb med]

*Osnivač:* dr Srđan M. Jovanović

*Tehnički urednik:* Petar Stojanović

*Lektura:* Lana Kabić

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# Reč urednika

Posle nekog vremena, pred nama se nalazi najnovije izdanje *Savremene politike i upravljanja*. Iako je časopis bio započet od strane nekolicine akademaca iz Republike Srbije, primajući članke mahom iz regiona, u međuvremenu je došlo i do šireg interesa i van granica zemlje. Stoga treći broj *Savremene politike i upravljanja izlazi* (mahom) na engleskom jeziku, dok će se od četvrtog broja (2017.) i u uređivačkom kolegijumu naći i veći broj kolega i saradnika iz regiona.

Časopis je, pored toga, u ovom broju odlučio i da posveti prostor ‘mladim nadama’ regiona Balkana, te u njemu nalazimo i jednu lucidnu analizu savremenih turskih politika **Ajdina Đidića**, naslova ‘*Realism in Turkish foreign policy towards Syrian refugees*’. Đidić se u ovom radu osvrće na trenutne politike koje Turska vodi u povezanosti sa izbegličkom krizom, naglašavajući realizam i ‘realpolitiku’ kao srž sadašnje turske geopolitike, u kojoj se zarad ličnih interesa vlastodržaca izbeglice koriste kao tas na vagi koji bi u određenim slučajevima mogao da prevagne na stranu koja bi trenutnoj turskoj političkoj eliti mogla da pomogne.

Sledeći je rad **Mehdija Sejdiua i Albana Halitija**, imena ‘*The lack of ideology in Kosovo’s political parties*’, u kojima se ova dvojica mladih autora kritički osvrću na političke partije i stranačke politike na Kosovu od proglašenja nezavisnosti. Naglašen je nedostak ideologije kao primarna osobina političkih partija Kosova, gde se umesto razvitka civilnog društva i poboljšanja ekonomske situacije, političke partije mahom bave sakupljanjem elektoralne podrške na osnovu nacionalizma i protivljenja Srbiji u svetlu nekadašnjih konflikta na Kosovu.

Pored dvojice mladih autora, ovo izdanje *Savremene politike i upravljanja* nudi i rad **Simeona Mitropolitkog**, ‘*Bounded generalizations revisited: is the post-Communist area a world apart?*’, u kojem autor, nadovezujući se na teoretski rad Valeri Bansa sa Univerziteta Kornel, razlaže razlike u postkomunističkom svetu na makro nivou.

Rad **Esada Šahina** se bavi vizijom kapitalizma u paralelnoj analizi misli Saida Kutuba i Maksa Vebera kroz prizmu kritike kapitalističke modernizacije. Prisutna je analiza Veberove misli o odnosu religije i kapitalizma, kao i uticaj Kutubove misli na muslimansko društvo, uključujući i postavljanje pitanja da li se Kutub uopšte podvodi pod kategoriju muslimanske misli, imajući u vidu njegovu percepciju potencijalne reforme islama, naglašavajući činjenicu da je Veber iopisivao istorijske i političke odnose religije i modernog društva, dok je Kutub razrađivao sopstvene političke koncepte o odnosu religije i društva.

Pri kraju, Savremena politika i upravljanje u ovome broju objavljuje i jedan članak u vidu svojevrsnog 'gostovanja' **Marka Kasiolija (Marco Cassioli)** putem članka '*Lo spettro della pace di Belgrado nella "Rimostranza alla corte di Roma" di Joseph Maria von Thun-Hohenstein (1742)*', u kojem se političko-istorijske instance u vezi sa Beogradskim mirom 1739 analiziraju u svetlu odnosa Srbije sa Austrougarskom i Osmanskim Carstvom.

U Beogradu,  
Decembar 2016

*Srđan M. Jovanović i Veran Stančetić*

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# Realism in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Syrian Refugees

Ajdin Đidić

**Abstract:** Normatively speaking, a rather disconcerting side of the contemporary refugee issue has been emphasized in this work – a situation which became especially obvious with the recent refugee accord between EU and Turkey. It is explained and elaborated how refugees have been caught in a rather precarious situation ‘between the rock and a hard place’ or in other words how they were exploited in favor of promoting each side’s own state-oriented objectives. In turn, these objectives have been analyzed from realist theoretical outlook – an outlook which was methodologically best corresponding to a set of independent variables on all three levels of analysis. The paper focuses more on the Turkish side and the particular, individual actors, thus intertwining levels of analysis in order to situate the Syrian refugees into a wider scope of political events.

**Key words:** Turkey, refugees, European Union

On December the 30<sup>th</sup> 2012, Erdogan stood, dressed in traditional Arab clothing, with his spouse Emine, in the camp inhabited by Syrian refugees near the Turkish-Syrian border crossing of Akcakale, Sanliurfa province. He addressed some hundred thousand refugees who were stationed there after escaping deadly conflicts engulfing Syria in the wake of the civil war. His gestures and tone were indeed the one of a welcoming man extending his wide open arms. Besides these, he even went that extra mile, reassuring people that the victory is close, and imminence of Assad’s fall – promises which, as

time have shown, were not fulfilled. But what peeked my attention was his invitation to refugees to regard Turkey as their 'second home'.

Now this statement comes as a very peculiar one, especially when we compare it with the 2016 events. Thus, in line with recent developments, Erdogan stated the following: 'We do not have the word "idiot" written on our foreheads. We will be patient but we will do what we have to. Do not think that the planes and the buses are there for nothing'<sup>1</sup>. Here, planes and buses were an obvious indication pertaining to the readiness of Turkey to deport the refugees. This goes along his claim that Turkey has every right to deport refugees back to European Union. What happened with that friendly, hospitable man from 2012? Why such a sudden shift in Turkey's policy and their treatment of the refugee issue? Why is Turkey so willing to exploit refugees as a tool in achieving their designs under the new EU-Turkey deal if their terms are not fulfilled? Were refugees merely serving as a bargaining chip from the beginning with Turkey waiting only for them to fill the quota and hence create a stronger leverage? Our way of shedding light on this problem, on what is an apparent contradiction, will be through the age-old perspective of realism. We claim that Turkey from the beginning employed a realist-oriented foreign policy laden with *realpolitik* motives and hence this policy *raison d'état* was the main guiding principle. Therefore, the above mentioned ideationalist policy was precisely 'seeming' since what better way to legitimize undercover realism than through the invocation of *ummah* and 'brotherhood of all Muslims'. Now, as far as the methodology is concerned, as we stated above, we will mainly use the realist approach in accordance with analytical analysis corresponding to the 'why' question. The level of analysis will also correspond to realist theoretical framework which is mainly going to be based on intermixture of three levels: individual, state, and international. This being said, I believe that full analysis cannot be reached by utilizing state level solely, and to this end I will have to also introduce individual level analysis which corresponds to classical realism of Morgenthau and furthermore there will also be a word of international units as well. The introduction of individual level variables, for example, is due to the fact that Turkey, not unlike Russia, still does not have sufficiently developed institutions which are in turn subjected to strong, charismatic personalities such as Erdogan's one.

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<sup>1</sup> "Turkish president threatens to send millions of Syrian refugees to EU," The Guardian, February 12, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/turkish-president-threatens-to-send-millions-of-syrian-refugees-to-eu> (accessed April 4, 2016).

## Background of a Problem

Our paper will be divided in a couple of sections. In the first section to come, we will give a brief overview and background of the problem at hand, while in the second section, there will be word about international theories we will be using and how are they going to be beneficial to the issue at hand. The third section will deal with the geopolitical side of the refugee issue and the Syrian crisis. We will answer how Turkey from the start expected to buy political influence in the Syria especially in the contingency of Assad's downfall. Since this did not materialize, Turkey often took an independent and rash course in the region, especially towards Syria in line with its domestic concerns and national strategic goals, thus isolating itself from all of the regional actors and bringing reproach of the international community on itself. A similar pattern can be noticed during the late 1950s, where Turkey under Menderes led an erratic policy in Middle East, antagonizing all of its Arab neighbors and especially the USSR. Thus, in this part we will also discuss how Turkish policy towards Syria and refugees had also reflected on their internal concerns and how it was planned in a very pragmatic fashion. The fourth part of the paper will largely be dominated by Turkey's long relation with European Union and Turkey's obvious wish of accession to the EU. We will explain how the refugee issue is helping Turkey achieve this and how it could also help them bury the decades old question inhibiting their accession to Europe. The fifth part will deal with concluding remarks and future prospect courses that Turkey might conduct in line with its realpolitik objectives.

When we combine the abovementioned findings with the recent published articles and discoveries of Amnesty International (AI), it makes it even more surprising and not at all easier to understand. Namely, according to AI reports, Turkey, since January 2016, started sending refugees back to the war zone including pregnant women and children<sup>2</sup>, indicating the whole issue might never have been *about* the refugees. Starting with 2014, Turkey declared that crossing the country's borders will be conditional upon the availability of free places in the refugee camps and even since 2012 it started turning its face to European Union asking it to share the financial burden (Ahmadoun, 2014: 2). Hence, the question I want to ask as stated earlier is why Turkey led by

<sup>2</sup> "Turkey: Illegal Mass Returns of Syrian Refugees Expose Fatal Flaws in EU-Turkey Deal," Amnesty International, April 1, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/turkey-illegal-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/> (accessed April 4, 2016).

conservative, Muslim government of Justice and Development Party would backtrack on its original policy towards refugees and why would Erdogan fail on his promise given to Syrian refugees at Akcakale border crossing. Are they not welcome to view Turkey as their second home any longer? It is rather unusual for the government which based its entire foreign policy on the idea of *stratejik derinlik* developed by Turkish long term Foreign and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to change its rhetoric this extensively. Namely, according to Davutoglu, Turkey possesses two sources of power: its historic ties and geostrategic location (Davutoglu, 2008: 79). Based on these historic ties, Turkey seemingly utilized foreign policy reliant on an ideational prism, hence often emphasizing common culture and/or especially religion (Islam) in order to achieve status of a country which has the ability of manipulating the soft power without having to rely on Europe or US. The peek of this policy happened at the time when EU accession talks were everything but progressing, and foreign policy with US and Israel was at its lowest ebbs. Hence, one can imagine that domestic public approval of the West was not very high either. Not surprising, in line with this current, the Turkish president has been often compared to a sultan, or even more grandiosely to a caliph<sup>3</sup>. But the question springs up whether ideationalism and values can be manipulated to bargaining for a 'greater good' in national terms when an opportunity was deemed fitting. In an ideal theoretical type that Davutoglu was advancing (and Erdogan executing) apparently it could, yet only because it was never ideational in essence, but 'realist' in its purest form. Emphasis was put on enhancing Turkish international position and the move from a status of a regional power to a 'central player', even if this meant the exploitation of emotive sentiments within the region. An alternative reading of Davutoglu's 'bow and arrow' simile testifies to this, and in fact identifies Europe as being the ultimate objective of the Turkish state<sup>4</sup>, whilst the Middle East and hence the Muslim civilization merely serving as a stepping stone. Exploitation of refugees also fits perfectly into this theoretical explanation. The 'Zero Problem with Neighbors' policy too, was nothing but fictitious from the very beginning; indeed, just a way of giving support to regional strongmen and hence to the status quo and in turn extracting lucrative economic deals that benefited realpolitik orientation of the Turkish state. As soon as the status quo regimes started collapsing, Turkey found itself revisiting its realist attitudes, now clearly seen in the case of

3 Adam Taylor, 'The caliph is coming, get ready,' pro-Erdogan Turkish politician tweets, The Washington Post, March 19, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/19/the-caliph-is-coming-get-ready-pro-erdogan-turkish-politician-tweets/> (accessed April 8, 2016).

4 Piotr Zalewski, "How Turkey Went From 'Zero Problems' to Zero Friends," Foreign Policy, August 22, 2013, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/how-turkey-went-from-zero-problems-to-zero-friends/> (accessed April 10, 2016)

refugees. Moreover, ideationalist speech was abandoned in favor of raw power rhetoric when circumstances were ripe. Even if the Turkish administration did employ benign constructivist policies towards refugees in the beginning, which is highly doubtful due to the evidence at hand, the domestic strain took its toll, and thus policies were soon reverted to the ones of national primacy. Moreover, what we are trying to stress is that Turkey used the refugee issue for the Turkish 'national interest' and for achieving an immense leverage over the European Union in particular, and the Western world in general. Finally, the opportunity presented itself in the 2016 EU-Turkey deal, which was not only tied to European monetary assistance, but also to the future of the Turkish accession to the European Union – an age-old goal of Turkish policy makers since Atatürk himself. But the question imposes itself – why would Turkey accept this deal, why such a vehement shift towards Europe all of a sudden after almost decade of frozen relationships? The deal itself was mostly symbolic, and in our opinion, it was lacking in substance. It might not have been the best option for state interests after all. This is precisely where individual variables come into play, about which we will talk about in the following sections. The issue does not end there, since the apparent humanitarian policy directed towards Syrian refugees and support given to Free Syrian Army (opposition forces) gave them much wanted input in Syrian domestic politics based on exploitation of sectarian differences between ruling Arab Alevite minority and Sunni Muslim opposition.

## **Theoretical Overview**

We chose realism as a theoretical perspective that guides the research for one very simple reason – it is the account which most vividly explains and fits into empirical realities at hand. Long over are the days when politics explored what 'ought' to be instead of what 'is'. With Machiavelli, we have a return to Thucydides' elaboration, which in modern age was carried by figures such as Morgenthau, Waltz, Mearsheimer, etc. Another 'beauty' of realism is found in its parsimony, since international relations can be explained through selfish motives of states (domestic units of analysis) coupled with selfish orientations of leaders themselves (individual units). Intermixing these main motives of selfishness and self-preservation on three levels makes us create a better systemic theoretical account of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East

region and other powers with stake in it, as stipulated in the foreword through utilizing the domestic refugee element. Now, classical realists and structural realists might disagree about the sources of this motivation exhibited on the state level. Structural realists like Waltz argue that the main cause for the 'is' analysis of the crude empirical realities found in the world is due to the anarchic nature of the international relation where every state is compelled to live in the Hobbesian international state of nature based on the pragmatic self-help principle (Waltz, 2001: 160). But for the sake of explanatory power, we will have to sideline Waltz's account with all its merits in favor of Morgenthau's classical realist explanatory approach to empirical realities at hand. Namely, we believe it corresponds very well to the psycho-functional status of the Turkish elite, particularly Erdogan. Furthermore, in line with this, we believe that international relations on the third level of analysis are better understood through combination of classical realist motives on individual and state levels with Mearsheimer's offensive realism stemming from these on the international level, which is based on opportunistic expansionist motives, rather than with Waltzian structural realism, which is of defensive nature. In other words, if Turkey is able to, it will do everything in its power to expand its influence by any channel available, which is again dependent on the psychology of its elites and public opinion against which elites usually will not act for the sake of their own interests. When such opportunities are not present, it will play defensively, supporting the status quo. Thus it is also in the interest of the elites to gain favorable public opinion through amassing greater legitimization by persuading others to see issues in the way favorable to them – issues within which religiously charged language helps to a great extent; something which we will talk about in the following lines. Thus, even though the main focus will be on the state level, we will further elaborate how these state motivations expressed through interests defined as power stem from individual-level sources and how as such they reflect on the third and largest unit of analysis which falls within the international realm. A combination of these three levels of analysis will be necessary to shed the light on this problem. Moreover, we would prefer to use Morgenthau's classical realism as an alternative to structural realism in explaining why states act as they do, i.e. in elaborating on their different starting points.

This overview had its purpose in expounding the starting points for the theoretical framework. Namely, the image of the world today is not because of international relations *per se*, but due to the negative, flawed image of human beings. Politics is a realm independent from any other, and as such,

has roots in human nature and human rationality, which is power hungry, and expresses interests solely as power (Morgenthau, 2005: 1, 2, 3). This means that from the outset, politics through human rationality imposes limits on objectivity of itself which gives it a theoretical, scientific and predictable character, whether on domestic or individual levels. For this reason we shall not go about claiming that international anarchy compelled Turkish statesmen to behave in the way they did and develop policies towards refugees and towards region in the manner in which they did; it rather arose out of pre-set rational constraints and calculations. As Morgenthau says, this does not mean that Turkish policy makers are not moral men in their personal lives; what it means is that when one analyzes the situation through realist lenses, one cannot conflate moral intentions of a nation state or individual political figures with the ones of universal morality (Morgenthau, 2005: 11). Politicians are able and willing more often than not to wrap their pragmatic intentions in the robes of the universal divine will and order. This behavioral pattern is noticable in Erdogan himself as well. Not only is it a well-established fact that he is a Muslim conservative political figure who often invokes religious sentiments into his governing style, but he also does not shy away from pretending to know divine will and connect it to his own governance<sup>5</sup>. For if we agree on the starting premises that either interests are defined through terms of power due to objective policy agendas found in the constraints of human rationality, or that international political systems constrain leaders, then we will soon discover that invocations of divine figures are nothing other than search for domestic and, not rarely, international legitimacy<sup>6</sup>. But proclamations of universalism such as these are very dangerous since as Carl Schmitt noted through Proudhon: ‘Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat’ (Schmitt, 2007: 54). Not only that, but if one party is on the side of the divine, on the side of the truth, on the side of humanity, than that gives it an exclusive right to the dehumanization and thus to the annihilation of everyone who is not. If we employ classical realism in the line following Morgenthau’s train of thoughts, then we must necessarily see through this charade of ‘empty words’ and ‘post-factuality’, and focus on what it really is – political rationality and interests defined in the terms of power.

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5 Robert Spencer, “Erdogan invokes Allah, demands that protests end immediately,” Jihad Watch, June 8, 2013, 2016, from <http://www.jihadwatch.org/2013/06/erdogan-invokes-allah-demands-that-protests-end-immediately> (accessed April 9, 2016).

6 Erdoğan: We annihilate all terrorists with God’s permission,” Milliyet Haber, March 18, 2016, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-we-annihilate-all-en-2211695/en.htm> (accessed April 9, 2016).

## Turkish Policy on Syria

We can perceive two long-term realist policies of Turkish state on the domestic level, pertaining to two different contingencies in the case of series of uprisings known as the Arab Spring and Syria in particular. Expounding on this will be crucial for understanding why Turkey changed its policy towards refugees in the recent period and hence why it re-embarked on its century old European quest. Moreover, both of these policies have starting points in Turkish new thinking of *stratejik derinlik* and the search for the new and independent alignments as well as for discretion in policy-making far away from the US umbrella. Now, as we previously mentioned, the Turkish establishment made many overtures and claims to the imminence of Assad's fall. Not only were those claims of moral character, but it seemed that their substance was also taken quite seriously and various actions were undertaken to hasten this. Turkey provided the Free Syrian Army and its various offshoots with logistic help, military and financial aid, as well as training, which was often in coordination with the United States of America<sup>7</sup>. A rather telling fact of the Turkish support for the Syrian opposition is the number of leaders of the FSA given refuge and bases of operation in the Turkish territory (Holiday, 2012: 39). In 2012, there were thus 9 high ranking officers of the FSA residing in Turkey, including no rank below the one of Captain and highest being General (Mustafa Ahmed al-Sheikh). In the case that Assad should fall, Turkey would thus have a strong presence and influence in the most organized governmental structure of the fledgling post-civil war state – the military. Furthermore, the wide acceptance of refugees would have boosted Turkey's appeal in the eyes of the Syrian public as well, and thus give Syria's Northern neighbor a dosage of influence over their policy making and even, we dare say, the formation of a new constitution and government. In this vein, Mearsheimer claimed that the desire of every state is power after power and domination over its counterparts is a mean to gain this and to retain it at the same time (Mearsheimer, 2001: 2). The idea he proposed was one of 'offensive realism', or that a goal of every state is to expand as much as it can in the terms of military capabilities and gain preponderance over other states until finally reaching status of hegemon

7 Islamic State: Training of moderate Syrian rebels 'allowed in Turkey,'" BBC, October 13, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29591916> (accessed April 11, 2016)

(Mearsheimer, 2001: 5). Nonetheless, due to some later developments, he concluded that hegemony over the whole world is not so effortless to obtain due to several factors and that currently, there is only have one regional hegemon which is USA (with Russia trying to enter the play as well). Be that as it may, what we am arguing here is the revision of a sort; namely that preponderance and domination over other states within the paradigm of offensive realism does not have to solely consist of military/offensive character, but that the expansion can occur through different channels. One of the reasons it differs from the liberal paradigm is in the abovementioned starting points, even though both theories put state-level to the fore (Keohane, Martin, 1995: 39). Yet another reason lies in the zero-sum attitude. Some of these alternative channel advances could be how Turkey played its cards. Buying influence through support of different factions, soft power penetration, ideologically charged language, quest for legitimacy and threats of military involvements are all types of channels that Turkey utilized in its plan to rise above and make Syria see issues the way Turks see them. It was also an opportunity to get rid of Assad family, where both father and son were a thorn in the Turkish side for so long over many issues pertaining to domestic and foreign relations and security. Be that as it may, the Syrian state after the war was bound to be weakened militarily and economically, and therefore it was in the Turkish interest to prolong the conflict domestically at first by supporting their own faction against others, through mechanisms which Mearsheimer called 'bait and bleed' (Mearsheimer, 2001: 153). Turkey, as a central player, due to a plethora of international constraints and due to its own lack of capabilities, did not have capacities for an all-out war even if it often used another mechanism of blackmail against Assad (Mearsheimer, 2001: 152). And if protracted conflict meant more refugees for leverage against the EU, then all the more reason to follow such a policy. Furthermore, in line with the stratejik derinlik policy and the project of becoming a 'central player', a dose of independence and rashness can be noticed in the Turkish stance towards Syria, where various jihadi factions were backed as a possible check against Kurds in the region. Designs of the international community were completely sidelined. For this purpose, elites used inflammatory nationalistic language often supported by religious rhetoric to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Now if we agreed on the starting points that political rationality (domestic and international) constrains behaviors of political figures on the individual level of analysis, this then necessarily must translate to certain dynamics on the international level as well. Erdogan, during the heydays of the Syrian uprising, played the

role of a strong Prime Minister. As mentioned, he legitimized his role through obeying the utilitarian calculus which implied giving to the greatest number of people what they want. This was precisely the politics of the right spectrum veiled in religious rhetoric. A good example of this can be seen during the 2003 US intervention in Iraq, where Turkey, despite having parliamentary support to deploy troops to Iraq in support of USA, rescinded it, and did nothing due to the strong public outcry (Kosebalaban, 2011: 176). If the invasion proceeded as planned, it would have dearly costed the Prime Minister in the subsequent elections. It would not be so farfetched for one to argue that the entire stratejik derinlik and multilateral foreign policy of Turkey was established upon a similar public outcry and dissatisfactions against USA and universalist values expounded by it, which the Turkish public harbored for a very long time, perhaps since the Cyprus issue was revisited in 1960s and 1970s. Erdogan and Davutoglu knew how to exploit these public sentiments. That would certainly explain the strained relations with the USA during Bush's and Obama's two term in office, ultimately culminating in a total Turkish reorientation towards the European Union. The European Union, regardless of its position in Western discourse, was seen as a long-term Turkish objective worthy of pursuing, while the USA was never seen in a similar light, except during the time of the Cold War, when the US's military superiority was welcome against the geopolitically ambitious USSR. Even if viewed in purely economic terms, trade with Europe takes the biggest portion of Turkish trade overall, while trade with USA is negligible<sup>8</sup>. Therefore, domestic variables shape individual decision making processes and vice versa, which reflects on the third level unit of international relations. So Erdogan and AKP were simply exploiting the left-right (secular-Islamist) division in Turkish politics which was in existence since 1960s, coupled with his strong, charismatic personality (Toros, 2013: 1016). Needless to say that the leftist current was never democratically salient in Turkey due to the fact that later, with Ecevit, it got embodied in the elitist CHP, which further took away from its popular appeal. Also, arguably, one can also claim that Islam (and thus traditionalism) always had an uneasy relationship with leftism of any sort. Be that as it may, domestic dissatisfactions with the West forwarded by Washington got translated into realist motives of the individual level, which is how to gain and retain power and became a quest for unilateral involvement in Syria for the sake of changing political realities there in line with Turkish national interests (suppressing Kurds, installing Turkish-friendly regime) breaking

<sup>8</sup> Turkey, European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/> (accessed April 12, 2016).

free from America's intentions by disregarding their considerations. But this in turn involves us with the third level of analysis that we need to talk about, where Turkey, in order to fulfill its objectives in Syria, necessarily has to interact with other state units in the region. At any rate, these interactions were not the most fruitful ones. What it only remained was how to project the reality of international failures to a domestic audience in order to rouse up national sentiments and gain short-term legitimization that individuals in Turkish elite can further exploit in domestic political dynamics. In other words, 'barbarian non-believing Russian, ignorant Shias and murderous Assad' terminology will always find fertile ground in Turkish state that political elite in turn will find a way of exploiting<sup>9</sup>. All three of units need to be contextually viewed in interplay here.

Unlike what Davutoglu claimed in his 2007 thought experiment, Turkey, during the years of Syrian revolt, did not utilize 'careful' diplomacy, which in turn isolated it from the rest of the region. After all, how could it, since a destabilized Iraq and Syria provided no opportunity to diplomatically counter Kurdish element? Or, perhaps, with this approach, there was never any possibility of leading cautious diplomacy in the first place. In all honesty, the Turkish 'central player' project is very reminiscent of Menderes' erratic policy towards Arab countries under the Soviet security umbrella, which was probably one of the many factors leading to his downfall. Ziya Onis also claims that Turkish multilateral foreign policy might have been damaging to country's long term objectives (Onis, 2011: 49). 'A related criticism of recent Turkish foreign policy concerns its overconfidence and over-assertiveness without taking into account the trade-offs and the possible long-term negative ramifications of decisions made in the current international environment' (Onis, 2011: 49). This may be why Ankara's relations with Washington went sour anew recently. Or perhaps this is just a side effect of Turkey trying to become the central player (Onis, 2011: 88). Again, with the outbreak of the Syrian war, Turkish and US policies diverged further as a continuation of the 2003 process, where Turkey even supported jihadists (Ahrar al-Sham), which went against the main US principle of building consolidated Muslim democracies in the region. In turn, the USA supported PYD and Kurdish organizations which Turkey sees as threat. Yet what substantially undermined their relationship was Turkey shooting down the Russian jet ,which showed that Turkey under AKP leadership can be just as erratic as

9 "US unlikely to support 'killer' Assad, says Erdogan," Anadolu Ajans, Mart 20, 2015, <http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/us-unlikely-to-support-killer-assad-says-erdogan/65036> (accessed April 16, 2016)

the one under the Democratic Party. This happened at the time when the USA and the Western nations were coming to an agreement with Russia over Syria, therefore Turkish actions could be considered as an intentional undermining of this endeavor<sup>10</sup>. Kosebalaban notes: ‘Today many of the same protestors defend strict adherence to American orientation and criticize the Erdogan government of not doing so. At present, there is no major Turkish group that sees Russia as a primary threat to the national security, whereas the fear of Russian expansionism influenced Ottoman and Turkish foreign policy for many decades’ (Kosebalaban, 2011: XII). This might not have been the case in the pre-Syrian conflict time of writing of Kosebalaban’s book, but the situation has been changed significantly in the meantime. Russia’s entrance into the fray shifted Turkish public opinion against itself. For instance, Turkey relentlessly emphasized the negative role of Russians in Syria, especially pertaining to treatment of the Turkmen minority in line with the inflammatory language serving elitist interested stipulated above<sup>11</sup>. This, coupled with the shooting of Russian jet, effectively removed Russia from any possibility of establishing peace in Syria with Turkish mediation. It was also the last nail in the coffin of the Turkish-American partnership in the region – not only are the two sides supporting different factions, but because of Turkey’s self-alienation and unpredictability, the States turned their face towards Kurds, rather than Turks. Strong similarities with the 2003 Iraq invasion can be seen, but this time, consequences might be much harder to mend. Moreover, this incident made Turkish-American relations colder, and in order to break away from isolation, Turkey orientated itself towards Israel and the European Union – a point we will talk about in the following section. What is important to note here is how all three units of analysis need to be analyzed not independently of each other, but in a reinforcing fashion, in order to shed the light on events which lead towards the orientation towards Europe yet again after the long pause of almost 11 years.

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10 David J. Galbreath, “Will the downing of Russian jet over Turkey lead to a wider war?,” *Independent*, November 24, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/will-the-downing-of-russian-jet-over-turkey-lead-to-a-wider-war-a6746856.html> (accessed April 15, 2016).

11 Laura Pitel, “Syria air strikes: Russia accused of ethnic cleansing of Turkmen,” *Independent*, December 1, 2015, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russia-accused-of-ethnic-cleansing-of-turkmen-in-syria-air-strikes-a6755186.html> (accessed April 16, 2016).

## **The Turkey-EU Deal**

In order to better understand the Turkey-EU deal and its repercussions, giving a brief overview of Turkey-EU relations through 20th and 21st century is in order. Since the earliest formations of the Turkish Republic, their pretensions towards Europe and European values were obvious. The earliest attempts to enter the European camp could be seen in Turkish commitments to common defense against Germany and Italy before the outset of World War 2 during 1930s (Millman, 1995: 483). Europe at that time in the eyes of Turkish policymakers meant Britain and France which Millman rightly calls Ataturkism vs. Enverism (Millman, 1995: 490). After Ataturk's death, despite some flirtations with Nazis and fascists, Turkey did not commit itself to them until the very last moments of war when it pragmatically chose the winning side. During the 1950s, Turkey was ruled by the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes which was solely concerned with gaining the blessing of the USA and entering into their defensive project entitled NATO. Europe was also in shambles due to the World War II devastation, and it was preoccupied with its own recovery. Before the 1950s, one major breakthrough did happen. In 1949, Turkey joined the Council of Europe, which was seen as a huge progress, reminiscent of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, where the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the European family of nations (Hale, 2013: 84). This was, nevertheless, purely symbolic, since the Council of Europe does not have any binding power and it only serves to unite policies of states on issues such as human rights. Nevertheless, its power of recommendation should not be underestimated. In 1963, Turkey, for the first time, started making tangible progress by adhering to the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Economic Community only to submit request for full membership in 1987, which was subsequently refused due to human rights violations. Another breakthrough happened in 1996, when the Customs Union was proclaimed, but nevertheless it did not lead to full membership, since standards were not yet met. In 1999, via the Helsinki Accords, Turkey gained candidate status, but not accession status, for which it needed to solve several outstanding issues, including the Cyprus problem. Also known as the Copenhagen Criteria, they 'dangled' in front of Turkey's 'nose', where the Copenhagen Council of Europe had right to deem Turkey ready to start accession talks which it did in 2005, but by that time it lost its momentum, and by 2014, it was all but frozen due

to multiple vetoes by France, Cyprus and the European council. The recent authoritarian tendencies by Erdogan further retarded this process. To sum up, Turkey has always been baited with a possibility of an accession to EU, which was nonetheless not a forthcoming one. The deal between Turkey and the European Union has been concluded very recently, on 18 March 2016. According to the European Commission Fact Sheet, the deal consists out of 9 points with the ultimate intention being the repression of irregular and uncontrolled flows of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Greece via sea routes. The deal also stipulates that after March 20<sup>th</sup>, any refugee found on the territory of Greece would be immediately returned to Turkey, and in return, one Syrian refugee from Turkey would be granted asylum in Europe. Those refugees that sought asylum in Greece would have a very hard time getting asylum due to the Articles 35 and 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive. This opens up the possibility for blanket returns of asylum seekers without taking into considerations safeguards, human rights and safety of refugees upon the re-return – points over which UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi expressed his concerns.

According to Carkoglu's findings, in recent polls concerning Turkey's membership in European Union, around 50% of the population remains in favor of entry (Kalaycioglu and Carkoglu, 2009: 122). One can conclude that EU membership is still a factor that strongly orientates the Turkish decision making processes both in domestic and foreign realms alike. It has been a Turkish 'dream' since the time of Ataturk to be recognized as an integral part of Europe, and no Turkish politician currently has the luxury to steer this policy in a different direction. This is reinforced by the fact that the AKP government was a continuation of Ozal's liberalist current, and therefore opening towards forces of globalization, especially in the economic realm, was regarded as a must (Kosebalaban, 2011: 147). It helps to mention that with globalization, social mobility becomes a potent force and creates an inclusive sphere of shareholders which benefit from these policies contra the exclusive nationalist line of thinking. In turn, government benefits from their support, which is much larger than the one enjoyed by elitist Kemalist intelligentsia (CHP) or nationalist forces backed by isolationist sentiments (MHP). Here, one should recall the utilitarian factor we mentioned previously. Orientation towards Europe still remains a strong guiding factor that Turkish politicians cannot dispense with. Hence, besides the ideological side advanced primarily by Ataturk, there are many other reasons why Turkey should have incentive to join the European Union. Stability, security, economic development,

uninhibited flow of goods and services, open access to the new and prospective markets are only some of them. The sentiments of Turkish re-orientation towards Europe became particularly salient with recent developments in Middle East, especially in relations with the USA. With the USA turning its face towards Iran, as well as Kurds and marginalizing Turkey and other Sunni-Arab powers famous for their unilateral actions, Turkey in contrasts turned towards the EU. After all, Europe can turn a blind eye to Turkish securitization policies and cross-border conflicts with various Kurdish factions if their interests align and hence if the possibility for a deal regarding the refugee issue should prove to be tenable. The United States of America, on the other hand, cannot. This being said, it is not that the European Union does not have any benefits from accepting Turkey's membership either (Modebadze, Sayin, 2015: 2-6). But the greatest benefit Europe can thus reap is of a geostrategic nature by having Turkey serve as a gatekeeper. This being said, it is obvious that Turkey's orientation towards the European Union is dominated by two pragmatist concerns: one on the level of state elites, and the other being strictly pragmatist principles of their policies' *raison d'état*; two principles which reinforce each other and go back and forth either way. To protect its core values and stability, the European Union was always skeptical towards the idea of allowing Turkey in its midst, as exemplified by Copenhagen Criteria (Emerson, 2004: 1). Up until 2005, Turkey was simply not demonstrating that it was committed to regional stability and democracy, and therefore its progress after 2005 was taken with a grain of salt. Perhaps there was some merit in this European skepticism since with its second term in office AKP started passing domestic religious policies in a unilateral fashion, while in the third term, the AKP has taken a hardline on certain issues, sacrificing democracy for security – a trend which only continued with their fourth term in office in 2015<sup>12</sup>. Needless to say that European attitudes are also contextual, since, with the recent waves of refugees conflated with terror threats stemming from destabilized Middle East (ISIS), rightist and center-right parties have been witnessing a trend of increasing electoral support in European countries and the European Parliament alike, which might increase Turkish leverage.<sup>13</sup> Turkey had to persuade Europe that it needed it, rather than the other way around, by playing on this 'irrational' fear, for lack of other words. When one looks at the 2007 writings from, at the time, the Turkish Foreign Minister

12 Turkey, Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/turkey> (accessed April 13, 2016).

13 Thilo Janssen, "Far Right-Wing Parties in the European Parliament," Transform! European Network for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue, 2015, <http://www.transform-network.net/journal/yearbook-2015/news/detail/Journal/far-right-wing-parties-in-the-european-parliament.html> (accessed April 13, 2016).

Ahmet Davutoglu, it is noticeable how Turkey was indeed committed to accession to the European Union via the path of democratization, since despite everything, Turkey still needed the EU anchoring for domestic economic stability, legitimacy of the ruling party against secularist and militaristic currents, and overall attempts not to isolate Westernist forces within the society, which looked favorably upon Europe (Davutoglu, 2008: 92-93). These works can be discarded as wishful scholarly thinking far devoid of the actual governmental policies, which back then served to appease the massively religiously inclined populace partially, not completely, sidelining EU accession process due to its unilateral and non-constitutional nature; in other words, sacrificing long-term stability for short-term sentiments. Or, they can be approached as purely pragmatic calculations, whereas the 2007 policies served to maintain the ruling government in power, presenting those governmental actions as paragons of democracy against an intolerant Europe, but still keeping accession process in mind due to aforementioned reasons. Thus, from 2015 onwards, Turkey started vying for full accession towards Europe, while still retaining its religiously charged rhetoric, coupled with unilateralism and strong manipulations of country's highest laws, but this time using the Middle East and regional instabilities as a pivot in case that everything else fails, to which Davutoglu's 'bow and arrow' simile would certainly attest. One can argue, as Ziya Onis did, that, if Turkey had not re-orientated towards full Europeanization as a main axis of its politics soon after 2007, it would have led it to three instances: authoritarianism, unsatisfactory relations with neighbors, and the loss of balance in the EU-Turkey-US triangle (Onis, Yilmaz, 2009: 21-22). These consequences indeed did come to pass, yet the refugee issue presented new possibilities to a unilateral leadership style. Our explanation is more in line with the latter possibility. Due to the recent domestic and international challenges (prolonged Syrian conflict, huge influx of Syrian refugees, destabilized Iraq, threats from ISIS, resumed violence with PKK), Turkey changed this apparent democratic, peaceful policy significantly, sidelining Davutoglu's *first operational principle*<sup>14</sup> and hence sacrificing democracy for security. By resuming the trend of violence against the PKK, and thus by marginalizing and sidelining rising democratic Kurdish opposition embodied within HDP (which itself got conflated with terrorism in the eyes of the public), Erdogan committed himself to the elimination of this militant organization directly, and all the effective democratic opposition (HDP), indirectly rather than reconciling, since it was a more successful policy in a

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14 Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's Zero - Problems Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/> (accessed April 13, 2016).

divided society, which promised him and his party greater share of votes at the subsequent elections, and with it, a greater chance to change the constitution in favor of the presidential system<sup>15</sup>. Again, interests defined in terms of power connect psycho-functional and policy dynamics under the constraint of the “political” on both levels of analysis. The question that leading Turkish statesmen kept asking themselves was how they could continue satisfying domestic constituents (and therefore keep extracting individual electoral benefits in the process) by combining two seemingly irreconcilable policies: globalization and securitization. Be that as it may, this explains Turkey’s rising authoritarianism from the perspective of domestic electoral dynamic. After all, individual elite’s interests can be reconciled with said policies and presented as such, which in turn become the main guiding principle, as obedience to some abstract liberal criteria cannot be a ‘light in the dark’ for the Turkish state. What the AKP did was to persuade the public that if they are not elected, then none of the liberal goals would be achieved either, despite its increasing authoritarianism. Bargaining was at play. By understanding these points, one proverb comes to mind, one that says that problems and tribulations can always be converted into opportunities. Turkish statesmen realized this, especially pertaining to the relations with the European Union, and concluded that they can ‘swat two flies with one swing’. In other words, it was possible for Erdogan to gain positive feedbacks internationally and domestically from his attitudes towards accession and yet continue his policy of securitization, domestic unilateralism and national primacy, whilst sacrificing everything else by exploiting long embedded Turkish fears, better known as Sevres syndrome. Positive feedback from international communities and other sovereign states is exactly what authoritarian leaders strive for in the quest for the much needed international legitimization. For this to work, a strong bargaining chip was needed, which was found precisely in the phenomenon of the Syrian refugee crisis.

By analyzing the restarted political brinkmanship towards the European Union from the individual-level unit of analysis, and further connecting these findings to the remaining two units, it is important to notice the difference between the two of the most prominent figures at the time dominating Turkish politics: Erdogan and Davutoglu. In order to do this we must know their individual intentions. Erdogan, in the light of the recent events, certainly seems as a power-hungry politician with increasing authoritarian tendencies. Even

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15 Mustafa Akyol, “Who killed Turkey-PKK peace process?,” Al Monitor, August 4, 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-syria-iraq-pkk-peace-process-who-killed-kurds.html#> (accessed April 20, 2016).

domestically, he is doing everything in his power to change the Constitution and thus make Turkey adopt the presidential system fully<sup>16</sup>. Davutoglu, in turn, seems as the only balancing element in play here. We mentioned previously that from the domestic level, Turkey can ‘swat both flies with one hit’, meaning that it can continue being authoritarian and still make rapprochement with the EU. Nevertheless, this needs to be analyzed to a greater extent from the approach towards individual elites. It is indeed in the benefit of Turkey as a whole to enter the Union, but this attempt can be exploited from respective individual sides to further their own credibility. Hence, the role of the mediator between Turkey and the European Union as well as the technicalities of the process have been left solely to Davutoglu, without much interference from Erdogan, except for an occasional inflammatory speech, exemplified by the one from the beginning of this paper. But why is this so? Is it not in Erdogan’s interest to gain all the ‘glory’ from such an amazing project? Perhaps not as much, because the deal itself carries many of the difficulties as well. Financial aid of three billion euros that Turkey is gaining from this deal can be seen as nothing more than a token. Furthermore, the alleviation of the visa regime pertaining to Turkish citizens can prove to be a drawn-out, cumbersome and protracted process. In addition, if accession talks should be revisited, perhaps one or few chapters would be opened only, with no guarantee for any substantial progress. From this it follows that Davutoglu’s image both domestically and internationally would be tarnished. Domestically, he would suffer because he brought few or no results, and the refugee issue would continue to be all but solved. The Sevres syndrome might be reawaken in the eyes of the public, and sentiment of losing domestic sovereignty to Europe might appear, which will make Davutoglu an easy target for picking. It is obvious that European help so far was only symbolic, and that a more tangible commitment would be needed. Davutoglu, who took this project upon himself, would have to have demanded more aid as time progresses, and as such would not have been favored among European circles to say the least – therefore his international standing would have sunk. Europe, after all, does not need the Turkish Prime Minister, but rather an indispensable Turkish President. Erdogan would gain from these dynamics, where his role as a “presidential president” would persist, and he would appear domestically unscathed from the failures of the government, while on the other hand, he would still enjoy international legitimacy, since it is obvious that European countries need him personally for this deal to work, and will do their best not to antagonize him further, hence ignoring his

16 “Erdogan wants ‘completely new constitution’ for Turkey,” Al Jazeera and agencies, November 4, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/aide-erdogan-push-constitutional-change-151104165401294.html> (accessed April 13, 2016).

increasing authoritarian trends.

By realizing all of this, the question poses itself whether Turkey would even consider this particular deal. While Europe has the luxury of ‘playing the waiting game’ in its relations with Turkey, Turkey does not. Europe can always benefit from having Turkey as its gatekeeper in the Middle Eastern region, while Turkey, under the present government, seems to be thinking, unsurprisingly, more in short-term goals, perhaps for the sake of domestic legitimacy. Erdogan, as an increasingly authoritarian leader, needs deals like these, or at least their pending character, in order to divert international attention away from himself. It is quite obvious that Germany did not criticize Erdogan’s actions in the recent period because they did not want to push Turkey away from signing it. Shortly after the deal was signed, Germany order prosecution of a comedian that made fun of Erdogan in one of his videos<sup>17</sup>. Prosecution was, unsurprisingly, demanded by Erdogan himself, and Germany relented. This in fact demonstrates how much Europe needs Erdogan. Thus the biggest ‘loser’ in all of this seems to be Davutoglu, who was caught ‘between the rock and a hard place’.

International units of analysis also inform individual/domestic levels and vice versa. Turkey’s leadership exploited the long term national goal of joining the EU in its own way, which was in turn compelled by developments in the international arena, where Turkey recently got further away from USA, and the need presented itself for a new ally and revisited anchoring towards Europe. But this begs the question of whether is truly possible to create real and lasting alliances by pushing other states into it. To reiterate, on an individual level, Erdogan needs Europe in order to continue his authoritarian trend, with the ultimate goal of changing the constitution and the entire state system into a presidential one. On an international level of analysis, Turkey needs Europe to patch a ‘hole’ left by the US marginalization of regional Sunni states in favor of Iran. And last but not least, on a state level, Turkey always needed Europe due to the plethora of benefits that come with rapprochement which are mostly of economic nature, but ideological side and domestic institutional consolidation cannot be disregarded either. But in this most recent deal, we would claim that the individual variable was the most potent one. Perhaps Erdogan never intended for Turkey to orientate itself seriously towards accession. This is obvious from his recent attitude to visa liberalization, where he did not want

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17 Philip Oltermann, “Merkel lets comedian face prosecution for Erdoğan poem,” Guardian, April 15, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/15/angela-merkel-agrees-prosecution-comedian-erdogan-poem> (accessed April 18, 2016).

to bargain domestic oppressive terrorist laws for rapprochement<sup>18</sup>. The whole process of accession, initiated by Ahmet Davutoglu, served Erdogan's interest. By signing the deal, he compelled Angela Merkel and other European leaders to forget about his flagitious human rights account and authoritarian trends. If Europe wants to continue having Turkey as its gatekeeper, it will have to do what Erdogan insists upon. Reducing the criteria for Turkish accession may be one of the issues Erdogan is aiming for. By stronghanded the European Union, Erdogan achieved domestic legitimacy, while at the same time, international legitimacy was assured anyway, due to his personal and indispensable character. When all the cards were at the table, it was possible for him to finally dispense with Davutoglu and remove him from the party hierarchy, and thus premiership<sup>19</sup>. His last obstacle towards the goal of the presidential system was hence effectively removed. Using this deal, and playing both Davutoglu and European Union, Erdogan fully asserted himself as the ultimate shot-caller, a real 'presidential president'. It became obvious that whoever inherited Davutoglu's position would not be anything more than a figurehead and a puppet for an incumbent Turkish president, which turned out to be true in the figure of Binali Yildirim. Like with any other project of this magnitude, one only needs to see who benefits (*cui bono?*) the most in order to conclude that the grand ideationalist rhetoric towards refugees from 2011-2012 was purely instrumental, and not at all freed of interest. Indeed, there is always more than meets the eye.

## Conclusion

With all being said and done, we do not have bright predictions for Turkey at the moment. Expelling Davutoglu from the party can be considered as the last nail in the coffin of Turkish democracy. This is the act which made the AKP into Erdogan's personal vessel towards presidentialism and new constitution. But what Erdogan does not realize, or what he does not want to realize, is that this kind of arrangement is unstable. By monopolizing all of the AKP's potential, Erdogan greatly reduced the party's legitimacy and

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18 Tattersal, Sezer, "Turkey's Erdogan rebuffs EU on terrorism law; 'we're going our way, you go yours,'" Reuters, May 6, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-turkey-erdogan-idUSKCN0XX18K> (accessed May 7, 2016).

19 Jared Malsin, "Why Turkey's Prime Minister Had No Choice But to Resign," Time, May 5, 2016, <http://time.com/4320036/turkey-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-resign/> (accessed May 7, 2016).

ideological hegemony. Nothing remains of the AKP's original coordination. Now there is only Erdogan and his megalomania, slowly destabilizing Turkey in the domestic and international spheres. Turkey is becoming the very thing which the AKP was so quick to denounce at the beginning of 2000s - an authoritarian Middle Eastern country with Islamic discourse abound, perhaps anew the 'sick man of Europe'. In the beginning, the party's program was in line with conservative liberal rhetorics of the center-right, which proved as the most potent vote-getting current in Turkish politics. We have witnessed this from the days of Menderes all the way to the 2000s. In this case, history can teach a lot. In present experiences, there always emerged a single party which took monopoly of the dominant center-right discourse, which in turn made it authoritarian. Before, military and secular currents served as a balancing element, but since these have been removed during the later years of the AKP, this mechanism of checks and balances ceased to function. Our tentative prediction is that, in the period to come, the AKP will get marginalized, and in its place, many new offshoot parties will appear, propagating the same political orientation. Nonetheless, for the time being at least, these parties will not be able to garner enough popular support. Therefore the government will be placed in the hands of weak coalitional governments, which are going to leave their imprint on the economic picture of the country, and not in a positive light (especially in the international community). All of this will come to pass if Erdogan ultimately fails in his presidential pretensions. If he succeeds, then it will really not matter very much.

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# The lack of political ideologies in Kosovo's political parties

Mehdi Sejdiu

Alban Haliti

**Abstract.** Many long established political parties in the world and in particular in the Western Liberal Democracies are founded on ideologies. Ideologies promote certain values, programs, doctrines, myths and principles of a certain group, class or institution. According to Heywood (2012), an ideology is more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this be intended to preserve, modify, or overthrow the existing system of power. Ideologies serve to organize the social, political and economic life of the citizens, by also giving their take on things like morality, religion, freedom, individual rights, etc. Usually ideologies offer an account of the existing order i.e. worldview, advance a model of a desired future i.e. 'good society', and they explain how political change should be brought about (Heywood, 2012). This paper gives an account of why parties in Kosovo lack ideology and the ideological stance the three main political parties in Kosovo claim. Moreover, it also considers the ramifications of not having clear ideologies in political parties of a transitional hybrid democracy like Kosovo, which seeks to consolidate its democracy.

**Key words:** Kosovo, party politics, political ideology

## Introduction

Every man is political. A lot of us are unconscious about it, but when formulating our thoughts, we use concepts and political ideas to describe actions and behaviors. Ideologies, on the other hand, are systems of values, ideas and convictions on which parties are founded on, and through which parties offer solutions for problems their citizens face. Through political ideologies based on political platforms, parties seek to win elections and rule based on certain norms, beliefs and policies. Ideologies are heavily influenced by social and historical circumstances, through which parties establish their political platforms and determine their objectives (Heywood 2012). The question this paper will seek to answer is 'Why is there a lack of political ideologies in Kosovo and what the consequences of it are'. We will further elaborate on how the lack of political ideologies gave room to clientelism, nepotism and patrimonialism as a form of governance, 'replacing' the need for ideologies.

### **The historical background of the formation of political parties in Kosovo and voting behavior in Kosovo**

Political Parties started to manifest themselves during and after the fall of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The first serious established political party was the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo, alb. *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës*) established in 1989 and led by Ibrahim Rugova; some scholars consider the establishment of the LDK to have been more of an independence movement, than the formation of a political party (Hofmeister and Grabow, 2013). The establishment of other parties followed in 1990-1991; those parties sought to create a parallel political system, breaking away from Serbia and Serbian institutions. The New political parties like PDSH Demo Christian Party of Albanians of Kosovo, PLK Liberal Party of Kosovo, PSDK Socialist and Democratic Party of Kosovo, all failed to gather support and organize effectively like the LDK.

LDK was particularly influential outside of Kosovo, mainly in Western European countries, where the Kosovo-Albanian diaspora lived. The LDK

managed to organize the famous “3% fund” (*tre përqindëshi*), which was made of voluntary donations by the Albanian diaspora for the development of an Albanian political action and parallel institutions (Hofmeister and Grabow 2013). Other political movements worth mentioning are the LPK, the Popular Movement of Kosovo (*Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës*), and the LKÇK, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (*Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës*). As Hofmeister and Grabow stated (2013), these two political movements led to the formations of political military units with political requests regarding the independence of Kosovo, like the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA (alb. UÇK).

At this point, the main ideological difference between the LDK and the KLA was how to respond to Serbia's actions in Kosovo. This division brought a clear ideological difference between two wings in Kosovo. The LDK sought to resolve Kosovo's issue through non-violence, its leader Ibrahim Rugova was dubbed as the “Gandhi of the Balkans” for his non-violent methods; on the other side, the KLA saw war as a necessity in order to establish an independent Kosovo. These two independence movements in Kosovo were commonly called the ‘war wing’ and the ‘peace wing’. After the war, the LDK became the party of the ‘peace wing’, whereas the PDK and the AAK were parties representing the ‘war wing’.

After the Kosovo War, Serbia had *de facto* lost control over Kosovo and the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) became the main institution governing the territory. UNMIK had a mandate to ensure conditions of peace and a normal life for all the inhabitants of Kosovo. Under UNMIK there were more favorable conditions for the establishment of political parties, so former KLA commanders created two big political parties; Hashim Thaçi became the leader of the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) and Ramush Haradinaj became the leader of the AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo). In the first elections in Kosovo, organized by the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Kosovo (OSCE), LDK won with 46.29% of the votes (Hofmeister and Grabow 2013), thus heavily defeating the ‘war wing’ parties. Nevertheless, UNMIK was ruling and administering Kosovo to maintain peace and build strong institutions. This led to a situation where all parties in Kosovo adopted the goal of independence as their main political and ideological goal, by also steering their policy proposals and political platforms towards the ultimate cause of independence.

This ultimate goal of independence hampered the ideological formations of parties. Their political programs instead of focusing on the creation of a social order based on values, principles and a vision, were merely presenting independence as their main electoral promise. Thus the right and left of Kosovo politics were all promising the same instance.

The first political party that emerged with a clear political ideology was the reformation movement ORA, established in 2004. As Hofmeister and Grabov explain, the ORA was a clear left-wing party, with leftist economic policies and clear proposals of state intervention on the issue related to public enterprises, which are particularly important in Kosovo (2013), given the monopoly they have in the market (an economic legacy of socialist Yugoslavia). However, the ORA did not manage to refresh the political sphere in Kosovo, and political parties in Kosovo remained mere entities promising independence for Kosovo. Moreover, the lack of political ideologies was delayed because of challenges political leaders faced with the Prishtina-Belgrade negotiations as well, imposed by the United Nations and mediated by the UN special envoy Marti Ahtisaari.

The independence of Kosovo as a goal became 'the right and left of politics'. It transformed into a plan, compensating for the lack of ideologies and the lack of willingness to align with political ideologies. The prolonged presence of UNMIK, the superficial treatment of Kosovo's political parties and the Provisional Government before the independence had also a detrimental impact on the lack of the formation of political parties with clear ideologies. The main 'ideology' of the political parties remained independence, and in cases like Vetëvendosje, it was more nationalistic, and promised unification with Albania.

From the perspective of the (Albanian) Kosovar voter, who could vote after the war that saw ten thousand killed and a hundred thousand people displaced, voting for an ideological party was not as important as voting for the promise of a fully independent Kosovo. The lack of political culture and voting behavior made it easy for political parties not to offer concrete policies on economy, security, education, infrastructure, energy, relationship of the individual with the state, etc. Moreover, poverty, clientelism, a system of patronage, corruption, violation of law, etc., were skimmed over, and Kosovars voted for political parties who had fought for the country and were working on declaring independence. Voting was translated into a sign of loyalty to those who fought in the war. '*Ku je kane ne vakt te luftes?*' (Where have you

been during the war?") was a common expression used in debates and public to determine the values and importance of the politicians who were running for various offices. The other voting behavior was through self-interest, where people voted or lobbied for a certain party in order to get material or non-material gains, either through public contracts, or employment. Thus every party in office would appoint family or party members to various state owned enterprises and public institutions. This system of patronage led to a large inefficient and clientelist bureaucracy in many Kosovo institutions, including public companies which already were monopolies.

The tight relationship with the war and politics brought upon established parties that were connected to the war, and made other parties seem irrelevant, even when they had clear economic proposals like the ORA or the FER *Fryma e Re* (New Spirit Party). Even today, the four main parties of Kosovo are parties with roots in the Kosovo war. The LDK was the party of Rugova, who sought a peaceful non-violent approach to the conflict; the PDK and the AAK are from what is called the 'war wing' in Kosovo; a large number of the main political figures of the PDK and AAK were generals and colonels of the KLA; in PDK's case, a lot of public figures were part of SHIK, the infamous secret agency accused for murdering LDK members after the war. The current leader of the PDK, Kadri Veseli, was the main person in SHIK (Kallxo, 2012). *Vetëvendosje*, on the other hand, was made up of young students who participated in the Prishtina student demonstrations in the 1980s, a key protest which resulted in the national awakening of Albanian-Kosovars, led to mass protests chanting 'Kosovo Republic' and demanding complete separation from Serbia, whereas political parties who did not emerge as a reaction to Serbia or the Kosovo war were less prone to gain votes and mainly did not pass the 5% election threshold. Examples of that are the ORA, the first clear-cut ideological party of Kosovo, then the FER which was made of young Kosovo intellectuals and technocrats who mainly studied abroad; the FER, after not passing the 5% threshold, merged with *Vetëvendosje*.

The AKR (New Kosovo Alliance) was founded by the famous Kosovar businessman Behxhet Pacolli in 2006. In the 2007 elections, the AKR became the third largest party in the state and enjoyed significant support in Kosovo, thus becoming the first non-war related party to enter Kosovo's parliament. However, the enthusiasm regarding the AKR waned when its leader Behxhet Pacolli failed to be elected president after the coalition with the PDK. The AKR-PDK coalition was a 'political suicide' for the AKR, which in the last general elections in 2013, did not manage to pass the 5% threshold. It is important to

note that Kosovo's main religion is Islam, however, every attempt for some form of political Islam failed, since these parties never managed to pass the 5% threshold alone as an Islamic Party.

War, instead of ideology, became the main difference between political parties. When looking at shares of votes in each election cycle in Kosovo, one can observe how regions where former PDK figures of the KLA had a strong presence, like the Drenica region, Shtime and Kaçanik, are considered to be strongholds of the PDK. Even 15 years after the war, the PDK wins single handedly in those parts, whilst oppositional parties usually perform very poorly. On the other hand, the KLA 'war wing' of the AAK had strong presence in the Dukagjin region of Kosovo, where they usually gather their biggest share of votes in large cities like Peja, Gjakova, Junik and Deçan. However, the AAK failed to consolidate in these cities, which were more successfully challenged by oppositional parties. The LDK, on the other hand, has a strong presence in the capital, where they won the local election for 14 consecutive years, until they lost against *Vetëvendosje's* Shpend Ahmeti, which brought a more policy-based campaign. Other key cities of the LDK are Istog, Fushë Kosovë (Kosovo Polje), Artanë (Novo Brdo), Obiliq, Podujevë, Vitia and Gjilan, which leaves most of the other Albanian populated municipalities as 'swing' cities, usually swinging between LDK, PDK, and AAK. *Vetëvendosje*, although the third biggest party in Kosovo, does not have strongholds in specific cities, but does rather receive a fair amount of votes spread out in various cities. Ethnic minorities in Kosovo tend to vote for their own ethnic parties and not Albanian political parties.

This post-war identification of cities with certain political parties led to the formation of partisan identifications, which makes it very easy for parties like the LDK and the PDK to remain the main parties in Kosovo despite their poor performance. At the same time, it became increasingly hard for other parties with clearer ideologies to enter the elections. The only post-war party that managed to stay in Kosovo politics is *Vetëvendosje*, which entered elections for the first time in 2010, although many of their party figures had made a name for themselves during the war, and *Vetëvendosje* also accepted many PDK deserters.

Another reason for the lack of political ideologies is the lack of political culture *per se*. Kosovo lacked democratic institutions and elections throughout its existence. Under Yugoslavia, Kosovo had a one-party system, where the party dealt with the economy and policy making. Under the socialist

Yugoslavia, Kosovo never had any elections, the members of the party and their family members were in charge, and freedom of expression was suppressed when it did not align with the communist ideology, therefore communism in Kosovo closed the gap for any opposing/differing voices. The communist doctrine was successfully installed in Kosovo and certainly had a significant legacy on the political culture of Kosovars, who in the post-NATO intervention elections in the year 2000, were voting for the first time in their entire lives. The lack of ideologies is self-explanatory when there is a lack of democratic political culture and when the Kosovars were introduced to voting and a multi-party system rather late. At the same time Kosovo lacked a strong civil society, since every aspect of life was controlled by the state in the past.

Another impediment to the evolution of ideologies is the socio-economic condition of the Kosovar voter. Kosovo was the poorest region of Yugoslavia and remains the poorest country in the Balkans. Poor citizens are less likely to be active and democratically oriented, because their main concern is economic survival (Rose, Gideon and Tepperman 2012). The more economically secure citizens are, the more likely is it for them to more powerfully engage with their institutions and contribute to a more democratic society. The continuity of the low socio-economic conditions of Kosovars had also an impact on the lack of political ideologies, which were simply unimportant and unknown to these voters, who were struggling with their own economic survival. Like Lipset argues, economic development leads to democratization by bringing social and political change (Rose, Gideon and Tepperman 2012). This economic development never really occurred in Kosovo and the current mass unemployment (40%), makes it very challenging for the country to democratize and give room for the development of coherent political ideologies.

Considering the voting behavior of Kosovo voters, the lack of ideology and clear ideological differences between political parties in Kosovo, the political campaigning was done and is still done largely based on vague pompous promises regarding development, visa liberalization for the EU, and eventual accession to the EU and NATO. In the elections of 2014, the PDK, even though it had ruled the country for the last two mandates, had confidently promised the opening of 200,000 jobs in their third mandate, as well as visa liberalization within the year of 2014. Visa liberalization was being promised by Thaci since 2009; the actual liberalization of visas did not happen in 2016, seven years after the initial promise. On the other side, the LDK had promised 120,000 new jobs in their mandate, but what the coalition of these two parties actually brought were 50,000 people leaving the country illegally, to seek asylum in EU countries.

To summarize, the political parties in Kosovo were formed as a reaction against Serbia and their main ideology was to declare an independent Kosovo. The provisional institutions under the UN 1244 resolution brought a situation where the right and left of Kosovo politics had independence as their main goal, being less concerned for coherent political platforms, largely because of the lack of democratic political culture in Kosovo, and the low socio-economic status of Kosovar citizens. The political parties, instead of proposing ideological or political programs, opted out for pompous promises of hundreds of thousands of new jobs, economic development, visa liberalization, and accession to EU and NATO.

### **Three biggest political parties of Kosovo**

Political programs are one of the core documents in which political parties express their stances and vision for important issues of the electorate they are appealing to. Through issues like economy, national security, foreign policy, education, environmental policies, social policies, etc., political parties seek to gain votes and win elections (KDI, 2009). Through analyzing the political programs of parties, we can determine whether they are coherent and applicable to any particular political ideology. We seek to understand if the parties stand for lower or higher taxes, public healthcare, if they want to privatize public enterprises, lower or increase university fees, or if they want the state to intervene in the economy.

The first post-independence elections were held in 2010, with the assistance of international organizations political parties came out with political programs (KDI, 2009). In those elections, the PDK won 32% of the votes, the LDK had 24.69% and the third biggest party was *Vetëvendosje* with 12.69% (Dushi, 2013).

### **LDK- Democratic League of Kosovo**

According to the second article of the LDK's charter, it is a center right party (2012). The Democratic League of Kosovo is founded on democratic

values like: respect for tradition, freedom, justice and tolerance, responsibility and transparency, freedom of expression, individual and collective rights (Political Program of LDK 2012).

The LDK's objective is the creation of a European Kosovo, where democracy, rule of law, welfare of citizens and economic development are promoted. It seeks to stimulate free trade, free movement of people and ideas, supported by modern education and a society where values and tradition of Kosovo citizens are respected. The LDK, like most of other Kosovar parties, was intentionally confusing about their ideology being moderate regarding the social order, and moderate in terms of economy. Previous works on the ideologies of political parties of Kosovo (Zulfaj 2009), cite Kirchheimer (1966) who categorizes these parties as catch-all parties, a political party whose main purpose is to stay in the center in order to maximize the number of votes. LDK can be classified as a catch-all party, but it also has rightist leaning, especially for preserving traditions and values.

Historically, the LDK was formed against the socialism of the Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and it evolved to a party which sought to preserve 'traditional values' of Kosovo. It is also a part of the European People's Party, which groups together the center-right wing parties of Europe. The LDK however is more liberal than center right parties on economic issues (Malazogu and Gautam, 2014), it also has a more individualistic approach to the society, even though it claims it is conservative. The LDK is a proponent of the privatization of public enterprises, but it also stands for free healthcare.

### **PDK- Democratic Party of Kosovo**

The PDK was founded in 1999 by former KLA members; until 2016, the leader of the PDK was Hashim Thaci. When Hashim Thaci was elected President in 2016, the leader became Kadri Veseli, former head of the infamous Kosovo Intelligence Service known by its Albanian acronym SHIK. SHIK is accused for postwar murders of political figures in Kosovo (Kallxo, 2012).

The PDK identifies as a center-right party and follows liberal economic policies and conservative social policies. The PDK is a staunch supporter of the privatization process in Kosovo, under PDK's rule, Kosovo's Airport was given

for a 20 year concession, the Kosovo Energy Corporation was privatized, and PDK wants to privatize the Post and Telecom of Kosovo in the future. All of these enterprises have enjoyed a monopoly over Kosovo's market, and their privatization processes have gone through stern opposition from inside and outside of the party.

Important to note is that the PDK identified as a social democratic party in the past, it had good relations with the Labor Party in the UK (Balkan Insight, 2010), the Democratic Party in the U.S. and the Socialist Party in Albania (Malazogu and Gautam, 2014). Until 2013 the party consistently called itself as a social democratic party, until it changed their ideology to center right overnight. The PDK has been incoherent regarding to their ideology, it stands for privatization whilst at the same time enlarging the bureaucracy of Kosovo, which is seen as a leftist policy. The PDK also stands for agricultural subsidies, which is not a rightist policy in itself.

The PDK considers itself a pro-EU party and wants to integrate Kosovo in the European Union and NATO. The PDK on paper seems a very progressive party, however on practice it has earned a very notorious reputation in and outside of Kosovo. Corruption hiked during PDK's mandates, the privatization process of the state enterprises was criticized by many for being shady and corrupted. The PDK, in their mandates, focused only in investing on roads and infrastructure projects, and was characterized with closing detrimental public contracts with companies, such as Bechtel, where the previous U.S. ambassador of Kosovo, Christopher Dell, worked afterwards (Foreign Policy, 2015). Many of the PDK's main figures were punished by different courts for various violation; Xhabir Zharku (PDK Mayor) is in exile in Sweden even though he has been punished in Kosovo; Sami Lushtaku won his local elections in 2013 without a campaign and while he was in prison, but then was sentenced for 12 years in prison afterwards (Zeri, 2015) and Azem Sylja, a member of the parliament, was arrested by EULEX preceding the positive EU Commission recommendation for visas. The leader Hashim Thaçi is also accused for war crimes during the Kosovo War (The Guardian, 2011), however there is still lack of evidence for any possible indictment in the future.

This reputation of the PDK does not hinder it from winning elections, but makes it hard for them to form coalitions. Like in the 2014 elections, where it took the PDK 6 months to convince the LDK for a coalition, giving the LDK even the PM seat. AAK, NISMA and *Vetëvendosje* had categorically rejected any possible coalition with the PDK at that time.

The PDK is successful in winning elections in Kosovo despite its inefficient economic policies and their reputation for corruption. The PDK, however, does not emerge victorious because of its ideology and policies; it relies more on its robust partisanship electorate and efficient campaigning during the elections, making often use of the public broadcaster, RTK. The popularity is likely to at least slightly decrease in the coming elections with Kadri Veseli as the PM candidate, but the PDK still has very strong party structures around Kosovo and successfully manages to get new technocrats in the party before each election cycle. The fact that the LDK is facing internal problems with the current coalition it has with the PDK, and *Vetëvendosje* seems too radical and is not popular at the international allies of Kosovo makes the PDK's chances still promising for the upcoming elections, even without having consistency in their ideology and policies.

### ***Levizja Vetëvendosje (Self-determination movement)***

*Vetëvendosje* (VV) was founded as a movement in 2005 and took part in the elections in 2010 for the first time. VV's founder is Albin Kurti, one of the main organizers of the non-violent demonstrations in 1997-1998. The *Vetëvendosje* movement started with the slogan and graffiti '*Jo Negociata, Vetëvendosje*' ('No negotiations, Self-determination'). *Vetëvendosje* argues that the Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue can only be continued if Serbia recognizes Kosovo's statehood; in this sense it has a more radical approach to the negotiations, than other political parties of Kosovo. *Vetëvendosje* was against the UN Protectorate and against the Ahtisaari Package which sought to establish a Kosovo with a supervised independence. VV remains a strong opponent to any form of sovereignty that does not guarantee full independence. VV considers itself as a center-left party, but Kurti acknowledges that the circumstances and political system in Kosovo make it hard for parties to be ideological (Nosan, 2012).

In economic policies, VV is more leftist than any other Kosovo party, favoring an economic system which creates economic equality between citizens. In line with their ideology, VV remains a stern opponent of the privatization process in Kosovo and a strong proponent of the state's role in the economy. It favors redistributive policies, free university education, free healthcare and social services. It is also the only party with a more relaxed stance on

religion, supporting the headscarf in public schools, which is currently banned in Kosovo and is arguably the most important issue for practicing Muslims in Kosovo.

VV's stance against UNMIK, its criticism against Serbia and the pro-unification sentiment make it stand out more as a nationalist, than a center-left party. VV except of Prishtina in a local level was never part of any government coalition and categorically refuses any possible coalition with PDK, which it deems as corrupt.

VV is criticized within Kosovo for not recognizing Kosovo's symbols and its constitution. But mostly it is criticized for the uncompromising stance it has on particular issues, especially on the Kosovo-Serbia agreements, which it opposes not only through legal means, but through protests and blocking the parliament by using tear gas. Furthermore, it opposes the US and EU involvement in Kosovo's internal issues, by also opposing EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo). This is why the EU and the US are very critical of VV and its methods, which is somewhat problematic for VV, considering that (at least currently) in Kosovo, if a party seeks to win elections and wants to have favorable Kosovar public opinion, it is imperative to be supported and liked by the EU and the US, since most of the Kosovo Albanians acknowledge that Kosovo as a state exists largely because the support of the West in general, and United States in particular. *Vetëvendosje's* nationalism and anti-system attitude often overshadows the importance of the party's ideology and stresses more its nationalism and uncompromising character.

### **The consequence of parties without ideologies**

Ideologies do not serve as the main reason for why parties exist or win elections, but they remain an important foundation of the party's outlook and policies. In elections ideological parties easily distinguish themselves of one another, like the SPD and CDU in Germany, Labor and Tories in the UK, or Democrats and Republicans in the United States. As Heywood argues, political ideas don't emerge in a vacuum: they do not drop from the sky like rain. All political ideas are molded by the social and historical circumstances in which they develop and by the political ambitions they serve (Heywood, 2012). In Kosovo, the lack of ideologies brings upon a lack of ideas, principles

and vision in the political platforms of parties. Campaigning in the election and debates heavily deteriorate the public discourse, while votes get acquired through merits of war, support by Western allies, fighting terrorism, buying votes, campaigning for the party in exchange of favors and voting based on nepotism, family ties, or partisanship.

The abovementioned parties, instead of defining themselves with values, an ideology or policies, identify with specific people, families and small cliques. Thus the parliament (and local councils to a larger extent) experienced a metamorphosis by transforming from a place for political representation of voters, to a system of clientelism, which enacts policies serving their self-interest. Once the party comes to power, instead of enacting its policies, it starts appointing members of their own party in public enterprises, by either expelling the previous workers or by increasing the number of workers in public enterprises or in the bureaucracy. On the central level, political parties keep increasing government personnel in order to accommodate party members. Consequently, Kosovo became the country with the most ministries and ministers in the region, namely 19 ministries and 21 ministers. Kosovo even has more ministers than Germany, Norway, Austria or Switzerland.

Essentially, political parties in Kosovo can be called pseudo-political parties, transformed in interest groups which failed to consolidate the democracy, and ended up being led by clientelism as a vision. The policies of the parties are ad hoc, changing from one day to the other, with noticeable lack of long-term planning. According to one survey, 85% of the citizens in Kosovo believe the votes are bought either for money or personalized promises (KLG, 2014). Policy making is degraded, hampered and steered by personal interest. The biggest downside to this degradation is that clientelism has been installed in the mindset of political parties and in policy making. Even public opinion accepts that 'you have to know someone' in a political party in order to get employment, a scholarship, a contract for an infrastructural project, agricultural subsidies or even a permit for starting a business. The meritocratic aspect of the market is diminished and inequality is perpetuated by the very institutions that are supposed to ensure equal treatment of the citizens in an ideal world. Clientelism, although challenged, remains very strong due to the weak judiciary and lack of belief of citizens that the system can be changed at all.

## Conclusion

To conclude, the lack of democratic culture in Kosovo, the worsened economic and social conditions of Kosovars, the political circumstances after the war and the prolonged presence of the international protectorate in Kosovo, resulted in political ideology deficiency. This vacuum was quickly filled by various post-war interest groups who came to power and ultimately brought upon pseudo-political parties, establishing clientelism as a way of governance, indiscriminate to any ideology. Political parties in Kosovo may improvise their ideology, but in reality, political parties formulate ad hoc policies without any long term vision or plan. Policy making and legislation are hinged on material and non-material interest of actors, or even fulfilling criteria for EU integration, but are not based on a vision, values and ideologies.

The actual ideology of political parties in Kosovo remains *clientelism*. Clientelism as an alternative was a solution to the Kosovo post-war elites which quickly used their war merits to promote themselves to the state structures and enrich themselves through them. Clientelism was successful for the ruling elites since it ensured winning elections whilst giving benefits to small groupings that supported them during the elections. In other words, the political parties of Kosovo have failed to play their role as democratic institutions creating a democratic society and governing it on the bases of democratic values and principles, by opting out for clientelism.

There is no 'magical' solution for the democratization of political parties in Kosovo, but in order for political parties to be ideological, they will first of all have to start combating clientelism, in which the party structures are engulfed. More ideological parties in Kosovo would force parties to be more coherent with their policies and leave the bubble of clientelism and improvisation of democracy. This way, parties would start to be differentiated on how they envision Kosovo's future, rather than being distinguished on their legacy during the war. Institutionalized ideological parties would bring more people into politics who believe in the certain vision of the party, rather than recruiting people who see a chance to benefit from clientelism.

The ideologization of political parties is an important corner stone in the consolidation of democracy, especially in the case of Kosovo, a place that

unfortunately lacks political culture and started to just recently to have a more active civil society. Therefore, particularly in Kosovo, ideological party orientation would be a strong alternative to the present clientelism, and serve as a stronger foundation on which political programs could be based.

### **List of abbreviations:**

AAK- *Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës* (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo)

AKR - *Aleanca Kosova e Re* (New Kosovo Alliance)

EULEX - EU Rule of Law Mission

FER - *Fryma e Re* (New Spirit Party)

LDK - *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës*, (Democratic League of Kosovo)

LKÇK - *Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës* (The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo)

LPK - *Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës* (The Popular Movement of Kosovo)

ORA - *Partia Reformiste Ora* (Reformist Party Ora)

PDK - *Partia Demokratike e Kosovës* (Democratic Party of Kosovo)

PDSH - *Partia Demokristiane e Shqiptarëve të Kosovës* (Demo Christian Party of Albanians of Kosovo)

PLK - *Partia Liberale e Kosovës* (Liberal Party of Kosovo)

PSDK - *Partia Socialiste dhe Demokratike e Kosovës* (Socialist and Democratic Party of Kosovo)

UNMIK- United States Mission in Kosovo

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# Bounded generalizations revisited: is the post-communist area a world apart?

Simeon Mitropolitiski

**Abstract:** Since 2000, research has confirmed the main premise of Valerie Bunce (Bunce, 2000) that post-communist countries do not simply follow universal trends. They may also offer bounded tendencies. These latter trends equally apply to the key features and stages of political transitions and to elements of political systems, such as the levels of social capital and the dynamics of new radical right parties. In this paper, I will first summarize the current research since Bunce's work from the point of view of the division between big and bounded generalizations. Second, I will discuss the findings through the lenses of the paradigmatic debate within political science. Finally, I will offer an interpretative understanding of the big and bounded generalizations as a result of the authors' cultural background.

**Key words:** Post-Communism, political transition, Valerie Bunce

## Introduction

Working on the final touches of a project that links post-communist democratization with EU integration, I came across a few studies (Popova, 2010; Popova, 2012; Valkov, 2009) which had something in common, despite their diversity in terms of theoretical approach and subject matter. They showed the post-communist world as a region where big generalizations, generalizations conceived to apply to any geographic area, did not work well

when tested on former communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe or in the former Soviet Union. In fact, these authors claimed that these nations presented a different picture, where common features should be seen as regional, at the best, instead of global. I immediately connected these studies to Bunce seminal work on big and bounded generalizations in the post-communist context. According to the author, the post-communist democratic transition confirms some expectations established within the framework of transitology studies – or the big generalizations. Transitology studies are built upon empirical data gathered and analyzed from political democratization in Southern Europe in the 1970s and in Latin America in the 1980s. On the one hand, for Bunce, the big generalizations are the high levels of economic development in guaranteeing democratic sustainability, the centrality of political elites in establishing and terminating democracy, and deficits in the rule of law and state capacity as the primary challenge to the quality and survival of new democracies. On the other hand, the bounded generalizations are the relationship between democratization and economic reform and the costs-benefits ratio of democratic consolidation breaking quickly versus slowly with the authoritarian past.

The big and bounded generalizations, however, are not absolute but relative terms; sometimes big represents just a larger version of bounded generalization, without global claims. For example, Bunce names big generalizations those that simultaneously apply to democratization in Latin America, Southern Europe and the post-communist countries; she does not claim that these big generalizations must apply to other regions and to other historic contexts, e.g. the post World War I period in Central Europe. Therefore, I always use the big and bounded generalizations in their relative meaning.

The studies I recently came across confirmed only the bounded generalizations thesis. I was puzzled as to what such trend could mean regarding the Bunce's general argument. Could this diminish the relative weight of the big generalizations, as the post-communist countries were moving away from the initial breaking point with communism? Is there any specific circle of subject matter where such trend is particularly concentrated? Can we still oppose big and bounded generalizations as far as the post-communist world is concerned or is this world already part of a larger normality? The last of these questions had particular importance. If my first impressions were wrong and bounded generalizations represented only marginal studies within the literature, then the post-communist world, at least large parts of it, could

safely be taken outside area studies and put within the amorphous body of general comparative studies.

I will answer these and other questions that come up in the process of a study based on evidence from articles published in the peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal 'Communist and Post-communist studies' after 2002.

The reason to choose this starting point in time is to make sure that the authors are, at least theoretically, familiar with Bunce's arguments published in 2000. The selection of articles follows few criteria. Based on information included in their abstracts, I use only those articles that treat the former communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, eliminating studies of current communist countries, such as China. In addition, I eliminate all those studies, which could not be included in political science broadly speaking. I also eliminate from the final selection all idiographic studies or studies without elements of comparison as well as all studies that focus on case narratives instead of analytical generalizations. Thus, finally, from more than 300 articles published after 2002, I narrowed my sample down to 23 articles.

Regarding organization, this article begins with a brief outline of each text from the sample based on the arguments presented by their authors. In this section, I outline the main goal of each article as well as its relationship to the existing body of literature. Next, I position each of these articles on the scale when one extreme shows big generalizations, and another extreme shows bounded generalizations, following Bunce taxonomy. After presenting the persisting dichotomy between big and bounded generalizations, I try to make sense of it by applying alternative explanatory epistemological approaches: positivist, instrumentalist and cultural. Next, I launch a hypothesis that correlates the presence and persistence of the big-bounded generalizations dichotomy to different cultural archetypes, more precisely to religious backgrounds that influences researchers in one or another direction. I test and confirm this hypothesis on the sample of 23 articles. Finally, I present interpretative suggestions as to the reasons researchers make arguments consistent with big or bounded generalizations, suggestions extracted mainly from semi-directive interviews taken during disciplinary and interdisciplinary conferences.

## Evidence sample

In this section, I briefly present all articles from the sample in chronological order of their publishing, providing main objectives and theoretical or model engagements that put them in relation, in harmony or in collision, to existing literature. The main elements of this narrative are included in the first two columns of table 1.

Agh (2002) investigates the contradictions facing social-democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe. He claims that unlike the West European social-democratic parties that have experienced with various versions of “Third Way” policies, their East European homologues have had to overcome economic deficit through creating huge social deficit. Pollack (2002) tries to explain the social and political upheaval in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) by using a theoretical model worked out by Pierre Bourdieu. The author claims that by applying this approach on the systems change in the GDR it is not only possible to determine the structural and functional conditions of the upheaval, but also to describe the concrete historical processes of how the upheaval took place. Nikolenyi (2003) provides a solution for theoretical puzzles created after the formation of minority government in the Czech Republic after the elections of 1998. He claims that neither theories of coalition formation nor those of minority government formation provide an accurate prediction for this outcome. Instead, he bases his analysis on game theory. Aligica (2003) discusses the conceptual model behind the widespread belief that in post-communist societies, once the democratic and market institutions are introduced, the emerging values engendered by those very institutions will create the conditions for the consolidation and reproduction of democracy and a market economy. The author claims that the direct relationship between institutional structures, institutional learning and emerging values in this historic context is difficult to establish and substantiate. Wiatr (2003) illustrates the importance of reformist leadership in post-communist democratization, thus siding together with those authors who emphasize its conceptual importance. He makes his demonstration on the basis of empirical studies made in Poland since 1966. Marks (2004) examines the social composition of the communist party in the Soviet Union and in four East European countries during the post-war period

in light of two alternative explanations for joining the communist party: the classical political participation model and the party policy model. He finds much stronger support for the political participation model. Thorson (2004) analyzes why politicians create an independent judicial institution with the authority to overrule their own decisions. The author claims, based on empirical evidence from post-communist Russia, that political actors establish a constitutional court to enhance their democratic credibility. Buttrick and Moran (2005) argue that there is a spurious correlation between social capital and economic development in the regions of post-communist Russia. This argument rejects Putnam's hypothesis that social capital is the ubiquitous cause of economic growth. Rather, the data presented indicates that individualistic behavior in the form of entrepreneurship has been the prerequisite for growth in post-communist Russia. Ganev (2005) answers the question why did the infrastructure of governance deteriorate considerably immediately after the collapse of the old regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? He claim that the process of democratization represents, contrary to Charles Tilly's hypothesis of state formation, a process of weakening, not strengthening the state. Hug (2005) suggests that the political effects of referendums should vary according to the institutional provisions that allow for direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. The paper demonstrates effects of different institutional provisions on policy outcomes, which, so far, have only been demonstrated at the sub-national level, for example, in the United States and Switzerland. Kubicek (2005) examines the extent of European Union involvement in Ukraine and its results. As authoritarianism in this country became more pronounced in the early 2000s, the EU began to disengage from the country. The article argues that part of the problem was that the EU never applied political conditionality to Ukraine as it had with other states. Thames (2005) studies legislative behavior in post-communist Ukraine in relation to party affiliation and the role it plays in legislator voting decisions. The author claims that the evidence from Ukraine confirms the existence of party effects, previously established on the case of the United States; the author, however, also claims that the ability of a party to affect deputies does not depend on the strength of the party label as it does in the US case. Bunce and Wolchik (2006) analyze a number of elections in post-communist regimes, perched between democracy and dictatorship, between 1995 and 2005 that have led to the triumph of liberal oppositions over illiberal incumbents. The authors test this evidence with international diffusion as an explanatory multivariable model. They claim that despite the evidence, the cross-national diffusion of the electoral model in this region may

have run its course, largely because of less supportive local and international conditions. Luhiste (2006) seeks to identify variables that explain trust in political institutions. The author tests different theories of institutional trust with individual-level survey data from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Building on prior research, two competitive theories, both the cultural and performance explanations are identified and tested. The results show that both cultural and performance variables influence citizens' trust in political institutions. Shulman (2006) tests the assertion that ethnic and regional cultural heterogeneity is a source of conflict and alienation in a state with respect to ethnic and regional differences in Ukraine. The results of this analysis suggest that subjective cultural differences in this country do not substantially undermine national identity, but they do weaken national unity. Kuzio (2008) builds on Ishiyama's (1998) seminal study of Communist successor parties by providing a comparative study of the fate of Communist successor parties in Eurasia and Central-Eastern Europe. Kuzio outlines four paths undertaken by Communist parties in former Communist states: those countries that rapidly transformed Communist parties into center-left parties; countries that were slower at achieving this; countries with imperial legacies; and Eurasian autocracies. Petrovic (2008) analyzes the reasons for the division of post-communist Eastern Europe on better performing countries from Central Europe and the Baltic region and laggards from the Balkans. While not denying the relevance and structural impacts of some historical and geopolitical facts concerning the establishment of these differences, the author argues that there is a limited explanatory value to structural arguments of the role of initial conditions in assessing the reasons for the slower progress of the Balkan states in post-communist reform. Tworzecki (2008) focuses on the case of Poland to examine the phenomenon of widespread popular disengagement from civic and political life by testing the relative explanatory power of cultural and institutional hypotheses. The former sees disengagement as the consequence of values and patterns of behavior that are in some ways incompatible with pluralist politics, whereas the latter sees disengagement as the result of a mismatch between the realm of politically relevant individual interests and identities on the one hand, and the realm of available institutions of state-society intermediation on the other. Aidukaite (2009) reviews theoretical and empirical literature written on welfare state development in post-communist Eastern Europe in the light of the theories and approaches that have been developed to study affluent capitalist democracies. The author states that the exclusion of former communist countries for more than twenty years from welfare state theorizing has created an empirical and theoretical

gap. Therefore, it is necessary not only to test already existing welfare state theories, definitions, typologies and approaches on these countries, but also to advance them. Koinova (2009) states that contrary to the predominant understanding in the literature that diasporas act in exclusively nationalist ways, they do engage with the democratization of their home countries. Drawing evidence from the activities of the Ukrainian, Serbian, Albanian and Armenian diasporas after the end of communism, the author argues that diasporas filter international pressure to democratize post-communist societies by utilizing democratic procedures to advance unresolved nationalist goals. Valkov (2009) challenges the hypothesis that there is cohabitation of civic engagement and democratic institutions and practices. For him, while valid at a general level, the relationship is not confirmed once it is scrutinized thoroughly and heterogeneous categories are disaggregated. For the European post-communist cases, the pattern of the relationship between the regime type and the propensity to associate closely resembles the one in Latin mature democracies and non-authoritarian countries, provided that voluntary associations are chosen as measurements of vitality of social capital and robustness of civil society. Ganev (2011) builds upon insights derived from the literature on fiscal sociology and from Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of modern tax states, to outline a new approach to the study of various phenomena related to revenue-collection in post-communism. Having identified important gaps in the understanding of the transformative processes that engulfed the region after 1989, the paper introduces a more comprehensive research program focused on the context-specific challenges inherent in the attempt to re-establish tax states in the formerly communist countries. Rybar (2011) shows that the dominant theory of European integration, liberal intergovernmentalism, contains several assumptions about the process and character of national preference formation that may not be fully met in the post-communist EU member states. The author argues that the primacy of economic and societal interests in influencing positions of national governments should not be taken for granted. Using Slovakia as an example, he demonstrates the autonomy of political and bureaucratic actors and importance of their preferences. He also argues that ideational and exogenous factors should not be left out in constructing a realistic framework of national preference formation.

## **Taking sides on the big-bounded generalization scale**

The articles presented in the previous section make simple taxonomy big-bounded generalization a rather tricky enterprise. Unlike the works that Bunce (2005) quotes to illustrate her argument, the literature after 2002 is focused not only on general issues, such as causes for post-communist democratization; it is also interested in more specific issues, such as party affiliation, welfare development or relations between institutional arrangements and referendum results. Even if the big question of factors leading toward different political regimes is still present the more recent studies, when they confront it, they try to zoom deeper inside the big picture, to the elements that were overlooked in the 1990s when Bunce (2005) accumulated her empirical evidence. Despite this more nuance approach, it is still possible to put the more recent research on the scale between big and bounded generalizations.

To properly categorize different articles from the sample, I take as a key criterion the authors' intentions. For example, an author that states his or her intentions to show how post-communist patterns support a particular general theory or model will be classified within the group of big generalizations; correspondingly, authors that state intentions to show how post-communist patterns, applying to many countries, differ from some universal general patterns will be classified within the group of bounded generalizations. Therefore, I am not focusing on the question of whether the author's findings really match their intentions. I am not making a police investigation as to whether their findings warrant their initial general statements. At this point I accept their claims at their face value, without critical evaluation. This categorization can also be found in the third column of Table 1.

The findings suggest that one group of studies falls openly within the big generalizations argument. According to this argument, general laws of causality apply equally well to post-communist countries in particular. These general laws are established by studying material evidence from regions and countries outside the post-communist context, but when tested on post-communist cases, these theories or models are largely confirmed, although sometimes with qualifications. This group includes the studies of Pollack (2002), who considers the system's change in the GDR as following the logic of the theoretical model worked out by Pierre Bourdieu; Wiatr, who illustrates the

importance of reformist leadership paradigm with the evidence from the post-communist democratization in Poland; Nikolenyi, who explains the formation of minority government with arguments borrowed from the game theory model; Marks, who explains the social composition of communist parties with the political participation model; Thorson, who analyzes the creation of independent judicial institutions with the game theory model of enhancing democratic credibility; Hug, who claims that political effects of referendums follow general patterns established through studies in the United States and Switzerland; Kubicek, who examines the extent of EU involvement in Ukraine and its results within the theoretical framework of EU conditionality; Thames, who studies legislative behavior in post-communist context and confirms the existence of party effects previously established on the case of the United States; Luhiste, who seeks to confirm that two competitive theories, the cultural and performance explanation, both explain trust in political institutions; Shulman, who separates different elements within tested models, some of which confirm theoretical predictions; Kuzio, who builds on Ishiyama's seminal study of Communist successor parties in order to provide a comparative study of the fate of Communist successor parties in Eurasia and Central-Eastern Europe; Tworzecki, who focuses on the case of Poland to examine the phenomenon of widespread popular disengagement from civic and political life by confirming the explanatory power of both cultural and institutional hypotheses; and Aidukaite, who explains welfare state development in post-communist Eastern Europe by using theories and approaches that have been developed to study affluent capitalist democracies.

Another group of studies supports the bounded generalization paradigm. They all agree that some patterns in the post-communist context contradict the universality patterns established by studying different regions and different historic contexts. This group includes Agh, who claims that unlike the West European social-democratic parties that have experienced various versions of the "Third Way" policies, their East European homologues had to overcome economic deficit through creating huge social deficit; Aligica, who claims that in the post-communist context the direct relationship between institutional structures, institutional learning and emerging values is difficult to establish and substantiate; Buttrick and Moran, who argue that there is a spurious correlation between social capital and economic development, an argument maintained by Putnam, in the regions of post-communist Russia; Ganev, who claims that the process of democratization in the post-communist context represents, contrary to Charles Tilly's hypothesis of state

formation, a process of weakening, not strengthening the state; Bunce and Wolchik, who claim that the cross-national diffusion of the electoral model in the post-communist region may have run its course, largely because of less supportive local and international conditions; Petrovic, who argues that there is a limited explanatory value to structural arguments of the role of initial conditions in assessing the reasons for the slower progress of the Balkan states in post-communist reform; Koinova, who states, contrary to the predominant understanding in the literature, that diasporas act in exclusively nationalist ways in fact do engage with the democratization of their home countries; Valkov, who challenges the hypothesis, inspired by Putnam's studies on social capital, that there is cohabitation of civic engagement and democratic institutions and practices; Ganev who introduces a more comprehensive research program focused on the context-specific challenges inherent in the attempt to re-establish tax states in the formerly communist countries; and Rybar, who claims that the dominant theory of European integration, liberal intergovernmentalism, contains several assumptions about the process and character of national preference formation that may not be met in the post-communist EU member states.

## **Explaining divergence**

The next step in this study is to answer the persisting dichotomy between big and bounded generalizations in post-communist political studies by applying different epistemological approaches: positivist, instrumentalist and cultural.

Within the positivist vision of the social world, a vision inspired from natural sciences, in which the knowledge streams both naturally and logically from the reality itself, the question "why the post-communist research falls into two groups, big and bounded generalizations" may at first sight appear unnecessary. According to this vision, inherited from the works of August Comte (1970) and Emile Durkheim (1895/1938), the main objective of social science is to search for general objective laws akin to the laws in natural sciences such as physics, chemistry or biology. The role of researchers within this quest for knowledge is to observe and report objective data and, as far as possible, to detach themselves from the studied reality in order not to bring in their own subjective prejudices. Therefore, any difference in findings

would reflect above all the differences in observed social reality. In other words, a study that confirms bounded generalizations would have faithfully reported an existing bounded generalization, e.g. the relatively low level of social trust (Valkov, 2009). There is, however, an internal contradiction between the positivist approach and the reported persistent dichotomy of big and bounded generalizations. This contradiction flows from the fact that positivism is concerned not with bounded, but with big generalizations only. Bounded generalization, the core of the area studies argument, within this epistemological approach, makes sense no more than claiming the presence of a completely different set of physical laws for one part of the universe. Bounded generalizations, therefore, create tensions that need to be solved in findings with new, even bigger, generalizations that encompass the deviant cases. Persistence over time of bounded generalizations, therefore, is a problem that cannot be explained within the positivist paradigm.

An alternative, the instrumentalist approach, may provide some clues to the presence and persistence of the big-bounded generalization dichotomy and to the persistence of bounded generalization. According to this approach, inspired by the works of Max Weber (1904), the central piece of any social research is not the objective reality but the subject of the researcher. It is him or her who conceives research questions, chooses general methodology and applies particular research techniques. His or her intentions are strongly correlated to research findings, which is a different matter from that of producing false research based on individual prejudices. Objectivity in science, to follow Weber's argument, is not absolute, but only a particular relation between arbitrary chosen methodology and logically following findings. Within this approach, the intention behind making bounded generalizations claims is indistinguishable from the will to prove the *raison d'être* of areas studies as far as the post-communist countries are concerned. A hypothesis within this approach may be presented, according to which it would be interesting to promote research within the post-communist world that triggers the thrust toward producing bounded generalizations studies. Researchers with vested interests from and toward this region, for example Ganev, Petrovic, Koinova and Valkov, due to their upbringing and strong emotional ties, would be tempted to focus more on particularities instead of general trends that would make this region indistinguishable from the rest of Europe. To the contrary, researchers with western upbringing, for example Hug, Kubicek and Thames, would tend to insist on big generalizations and discredit the basis of areas studies as far as the post-communist world is concerned. To make this hypothesis even

simpler, bounded generalizations could be expected only within the circle of researchers that come from post-communist countries. Given the sample of articles, is this hypothesis confirmed or rejected? It is only partly confirmed (see table 1, 5th column). Researchers from outside the post-communist world, mainly from Western Europe or North America, are overwhelmingly, although not unanimously, trying to place their research within the big generalization paradigm, although some of them, e.g. Thames, succeed in this enterprise only at the cost of reformulation of big generalizations in order to embrace the post-communist experience, exactly as the positivist epistemological paradigm requires. Within the group of researchers from post-communist countries there is no such statistical trend; the group is divided into two camps on the issue of choosing big generalizations, e.g. Pollack, versus bounded generalizations, e.g. Ganey. The instrumentalist approach and its hypothesis that tries to account for the choice of big versus bounded generalization on the author's upbringing, is not sufficient to explain the presence and persistence of this dichotomy.

Here comes to light another, cultural approach to the research question. It is different from both positivism and instrumentalism. It does not consider research as an activity that only mechanically follows its object; neither does it consider the object of enquiry as something only arbitrarily constructed by the researcher following his or her particular interests. To be sure, these considerations are never completely disregarded, but they are not at the center of cultural explanation. What is important here, building on the long tradition from Dilthey (1957) to Geertz (1973), is the subjective understanding of the meaning, in this case, the meaning that concerns the presence and persistence of two different trajectories within social research on post-communist countries. Subjective here does not mean arbitrary; it takes into account the subject and the object of research as an interrelated system, and researchers as individual platforms of different social discourses. Back to our research question, big and bounded generalizations within hermeneutics are different socially embedded cultural approaches that make sense of post-communist reality either by putting it within big or within bounded generalizations. Hermeneutics is a research approach particularly friendly in order to study differences and particularities.

Inspired by the cultural approach regarding my research question. I posit that it is a particular cultural background that finally makes researchers framing their results either as part of big or bounded generalizations. More

specifically, it is the culture of Eastern Orthodox Christianity that maintains the spirit of bounded generalizations while it is the spirit of Western Christianity, both Catholicism and Protestantism, that fights for establishing big generalizations. Speaking of religious background does not presuppose some presence of explicit and practical religiosity and even less looks to religious norms and dogmas as paramount to a framework of what is allowed or not allowed to be studied and to be reported. By religious background here I mean the presence of intersubjective archetypical values within a particular society that affect its subcultures, including the scientific community. To provide examples of past research on the correlation between strictly religious views and strictly secular matters, I do not need to go further than to mention Max Weber's analysis on the protestant ethic that sees the accumulation of capitals as God's blessing, a vision quite different from traditional catholic moral, putting the sign of equation between wealth and sin.

Of course, Max Weber is not alone in seeing religion as an ethic and a practical guide for meaningful secular social activity. Major figures of twentieth century social sciences, such as Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas (Mendieta, 2005) and Foucault (1999) have frequently discussed the key role of religious ideas as constitutive rather than purely reflective in important aspects of social behavior.

Back to my question, within this explanation where the emphasis is put on religious background, it would be quite normal for example to present different catholic and protestant approaches in producing scientific truth. I must here give credit to Bélanger (1997) for making me think in these categories. My hypothesis, however, is not about the differences between catholic and protestant science; my goal is to frame the Eastern Christian Orthodox approach and to put it in relation to the big-bounded generalizations issue. I must also give credit to Kristen Ghodsee (2011), who during her presentation made the conceptual link between the Eastern Orthodoxy and the bounded version of human rights, rights limited to a particular nation-state community without universal appeal.

How has Eastern Orthodoxy created a unique way of seeing social reality in terms of bounded generalizations? The Eastern Church that split from the West after the great schism of 1054 had no original intentions to make such bounded claims of dogmatic validity. In fact, the schism originated when Pope Leo IX denied the Patriarch in Constantinople the ecumenical title and asked in turn to be acknowledged as head of all Christian churches that were part of the

Pentarchy (Five Churches – Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem). It was only in relation to the Pope's claim of universal jurisdiction over all religious matters within Christianity that a special doctrine of limited jurisdiction within each Orthodox Church, autocephaly, was given its present weight. Autocephaly means that a person does not need to report to any superior religious authority in each Eastern Orthodox Church; each church therefore is sovereign but limited, to use Anderson's definition of modern national community as both limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1991). At the same time, each Eastern Orthodox Church is part of a commonwealth of Churches with equal status, which share a common vision on religious matters. This fact is important while investigating the phenomenon of bounded generalizations in current social and political research. The Eastern Orthodox cultural approach is at the same time one that denies big generalizations, generalizations that apply to all peoples, but accepts transnational bounded generalizations, generalizations that fall short of universal application.

### **Analyzing findings**

If my hypothesis is true, if the big-bounded generalization divide is due to a cultural heritage of divided Christianity and if bounded generalization as a way of thinking, in particular, is due to the cultural influence of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, then the researcher who has been more deeply embedded within societies with dominant Eastern Orthodox Christianity should more likely express the trend toward making bounded generalization claims. The evidence I use to test this hypothesis is again the sample of articles after 2002 in the periodical 'Communist and Post-communist Studies'.

Let me present the group of authors making claims consistent with bounded generalizations. It includes the following authors in alphabetical order: Agh, Aligica, Buttrick and Moran, Ganev, Bunce and Wolchik, Petrovic, Koinova, Valkov, Ganev, and Rybar. I have enough biographical data to analyze some of these authors: Attila Agh, who is Professor at the Department of Political Science at the Corvinus University of Budapest; Paul Dragos Aligica, who works at the National School for Political Science and Public Administration, Bucharest and the Hudson Institute; Venelin Ganev, who is Professor at the Department of Political Science at the Miami University in Ohio with a university degree from Sofia University; Milenko Petrovic, who is

Researcher at the National Centre for Research on Europe in New Zealand with university studies in Belgrade; Maria Koinova, who is working at Dartmouth College, Dickey Center for International Understanding and reports Bulgaria as her native language; Nikolay Valkov, who graduated from the University of Montreal and reports Bulgaria as his native language; and Marek Rybar, who works at the Department of Political Science at the Comenius University, Bratislava. From these seven researchers, five – Aligica, Ganev, Petrovic, Koinova and Valkov, were born and raised in three Balkan countries where Eastern Orthodoxy is traditionally the dominant religion – Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. None of them currently work in this region although it remains their primary research focus. The other two researchers from this group – Agh and Rybar, are researchers that were born, studied and now work in their native countries – Hungary and Slovakia.

All of these researchers, seeing the post-communist world as a field of bounded generalization, could have reached very different results if they had decided to use different theoretical and/or methodological lenses. For example, Valkov challenges the hypothesis that there is cohabitation of civic engagement and democratic institutions and practices. For him, while valid at a general level, the relationship is not confirmed once it is scrutinized thoroughly and heterogeneous categories are disaggregated. He claims, for example, that for the European post-communist cases, the pattern of the relationship between the regime type and the propensity to associate, closely resembles the one in Latin mature democracies and non-authoritarian countries, provided that voluntary associations are chosen as measurements of the vitality of social capital and robustness of civil society. Theoretically, Valkov remains strongly embedded within Putnam's (2000) unequivocally positive approach on causality between high social capital and political regime type. Methodologically, he uses Putnam's measurements, membership in voluntary associations, to provide statistical values to social capital. If Valkov had decided to follow another more nuance approach on social capital and its consequences, for example, that of Portes (1998), or that of Bourdieu (1977), his main conclusions would be quite different. The negative elements of social capital in an elite group within a class society would have made Valkov reconsider his claims about post-communist exceptionalism or would have given him reasons to link such exceptionalism with positive political development, even more positive even than in advanced western societies. Although there is no doubt that the Valkov's results, and for that matter, the results of all other authors within the sample, reflect his theoretical and methodological choices,

the research question here is not about this link but about the reasons why he makes choices that ultimately affect his findings.

On a statistical level, it seems that there is a strong correlation between the fact that some social researchers are influenced by an Eastern Orthodox mentality and the results of their studies (see table 1, 6th column). Being embedded within such mentality, however, if we use the cultural epistemological approach, requires cultural links of some significance. In other words, people should give certain practical meaning to their acts. The paradox here is that most social researchers are not religious zealots, they are quite the opposite, and even for this reason only, the meaning of transmitting an Eastern Orthodox mentality within the field of social research cannot be interpretatively explained with the intention to make such transmission. There must be another cultural meaning of seeing the post-communist world as separate from big universal generalizations; another meaning of making such bounded generalizations. There must be an alternative, not religious but rather, purely secular way for the Eastern Orthodox mentality to influence the social research findings.

### **The reasons behind different types of generalizations**

In the following section I present interpretative suggestions as to the reasons researchers make big or bounded generalizations, suggestions extracted from semi-directive interviews and presentations during a few disciplinary conferences of the Canadian Political Science Association between 2011 and 2015 and during an interdisciplinary conference focusing on the Balkan regions history and on its recent development (Ohio State University, *Beyond Mosque, Church, and State: Negotiating Religious and Ethno-National Identities in the Balkans*. October 6-8, 2011). Out of respect for the confidentiality of the informants, I do not reveal their names. I may, however, not hide their preferences, if any, as far as the big-bounded generalization choice is concerned.

The answers concerning the interpretation of the big-bounded generalization dichotomy reflect the rainbow of epistemological possibilities, some of which were already discussed in the previous sections. There are a few possible answers to the research question:

1. A researcher from the United States who was born and grew up in the Balkans looked at the question from a purely instrumental point of view. According to him, whether an emphasis should be given to confirmation of big theories or to areas studies depends on governmental subsidies. He says: "During the late Cold War the priority was given to study the communist countries as areas studies, as exceptions to the general rules... Since the early 1990s, the trend has been reversed... After the mid-1990s, once again the emphasis was put on bounded generalizations". According to this view, a researcher who wants to be funded and have better chances to be published should pay attention to the shifting institutional environment in a purely instrumental way.

2. Two researchers from the Balkan countries working in the United States, who make big generalizations regarding the Balkan post-communist countries, declare wanting to normalize this region by integrating it within big theoretical frameworks. One of them says: "We want to normalize Balkan history". Another adds: "I belong to the camp that wants to normalize history". Here, by normality, they understand putting the development of the post-communist countries within the continental general historic framework. In other words, by making research that emphasizes on big generalizations they want to show that the Balkan national identities are in fact part of larger European identities.

3. Two different researchers from the Balkan countries, working in the United States, who make bounded generalizations regarding the Balkan post-communist countries, declare wanting to show these societies as exceptions within the general flow of European history. While I investigate the interpretative reasons for this position, they first point out the objective features of this region that make it so different from the rest of Europe. (Let me remind the reader here that this is not a sustainable position from a positivist point of view; exceptionality within the positivist paradigm creates tension that can be overcome only by establishing higher levels of big generalizations, not by escaping toward bounded generalizations.) When I dig deeper, one of them points out the region's unique Ottoman heritage and the other Soviet domination during the Cold War; both informants speak about link of causality between these historic facts and the specific regional development of modern nationalism. In other words, these researchers explain their bounded generalization preference with the specific regional national identity of which they are a part. For them, this makes the entire region distinct from the rest of Europe.

The researchers quoted above are bringing in possible cultural interpretative explanations for the reason why an Eastern Orthodox mentality can influence current social research by stimulating the creation and persistence of bounded generalization studies. The causal mechanism includes the sentiment of national belonging, a concept that is not religious, strictly speaking, but which is embedded within a particular cultural environment, the same environment that becomes possible as a result of a religious mentality. Researchers from Orthodox post-communist countries are facing a big identity dilemma: to accept their national exceptionality as part of the religious cultural package or to try to overcome this exceptionality by putting it within much larger social normality, within big generalizations. Although it is not clear so far whether the result of this dilemma is rather purely automatic or voluntary, it is already clear that this result decisively affects the research agenda, pushing the researchers toward big or bounded generalizations.

There is already a vast literature on the link between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the development of national mentality in the countries where this form of religion is dominant. Some authors (Arnakis, 1963) go as far as to suggest that Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the key element in the development of Balkan nationalism as a result of the synthesis between ethnicity and religiosity during the Ottoman period. They point out this factor in not only explaining regional differences from the rest of Europe, but also in explaining the lack of progress in understanding these differences from universal western point of view. Other authors (Bozeva-Abazi, 2007) suggest that the causal factor between Eastern Orthodoxy and modern nationalism should be put within the context of new modern state building. According to this argument, it is the purposeful effort of these new states, by using the Orthodox Church as a known and popular cultural matrix, to shape nationalism in its present form. No matter which of these two alternative explanations we take, they both point to the same conclusion; the specific form of nationalism in the countries with predominant Orthodox Christianity is directly related to the cultural matrix of bounded generalizations that go hand-in-hand with this form of Christianity. Therefore, the current cultural attraction toward bounded generalizations within the social science community in these countries, despite its purely nationalistic interpretation, is in fact a direct descendant of the specific Orthodox religious mentality.

## **Conclusion**

The research question asking why the political science literature on post-communist development shows the presence and persistence of a dichotomy between big and bounded generalizations seems to have found some tentative answers. As it turns out, they are far from the simple positivist and instrumentalist vision of social science as a purely reflective or as a purely voluntary activity. On the one hand, the researchers are not simply following the subject matter; on the other hand, they are not simply imposing their categories on amorphous subject matter. These traditional explanations may play some role in explaining the arguments of some authors, but they are far from satisfactory in explaining the general phenomenon and the persisting presence of bounded generalizations. The cultural approach provides a far more powerful explanation. The social researchers are part of cultural communities that share common understandings. These understandings are products of centuries of religious mentalities that affect the way they see the world and themselves. The only possible way to overcome their bounded set of national identities is to embrace a new vision of nationhood, one that is part of universal human development. Without this intermediate step, they may never cross the line that separates them from Western-inspired temptation, based on alternative religious models, to build universal scientific generalizations.

<b>Author and date of publishing</b>	<b>Main focus of publications</b>	<b>Big - bounded dichotomy</b>	<b>Authors' upbringing (western or post-communist)</b>	<b>Correlation between authors' claims and their upbringing</b>	<b>Correlation between authors' claims and religious background</b>
1.Agh (2002)	Showing contradictions facing social-democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
2.Pollack (2002)	Explaining the social and political upheaval in the former German Democratic Republic.	Big	PC	Negative	Positive
3.Nikolenyi (2003)	Solving theoretical puzzles created after the formation of minority government in the Czech Republic.	Big	No data available	No data available	No data available
4.Aligica (2003)	Discussing conditions for the consolidation and reproduction of democracy and market economy.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
5.Wiatr (2003)	Illustrating the importance of reformist leadership in post-communist democratization.	Big	PC	Negative	Positive
6.Marks (2004)	Evaluating alternative models explaining membership in communist parties.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
7.Thorson (2004)	Explaining why politicians create an independent judicial institution.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
8.Buttrick and Moran (2005)	Discussing correlation between social capital and economic development in Russia.	Bounded	West, West	Negative	Negative

<b>Author and date of publishing</b>	<b>Main focus of publications</b>	<b>Big - bounded dichotomy</b>	<b>Authors' upbringing (western or post-communist)</b>	<b>Correlation between authors' claims and their upbringing</b>	<b>Correlation between authors' claims and religious background</b>
9.Ganev (2005)	Explaining deterioration of state infrastructure after the collapse of communism.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
10.Hug (2005)	Explaining political effects of referendums with the institutional provisions for direct involvement of citizens.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
11.Kubicek (2005)	Explaining political democratization with the extent of EU involvement.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
12.Thames (2005)	Showing legislative behavior in Ukraine in relation to party affiliation.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
13.Bunce and Wolchik (2006)	Testing the hypothesis of international diffusion of democracy.	Bounded	West, West	Negative	Negative
14.Luhiste (2006)	Evaluating alternative explanations for the trust in political institutions.	Big	PC	Negative	Positive
15.Shulman (2006)	Testing the assertion that ethnic and regional heterogeneity is a source of conflict in a state.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
16.Kuzio (2008)	Explaining different paths undertaken by Communist parties in post-communist states.	Big	No data available	No data available	No data available

<b>Author and date of publishing</b>	<b>Main focus of publications</b>	<b>Big - bounded dichotomy</b>	<b>Authors' upbringing (western or post-communist)</b>	<b>Correlation between authors' claims and their upbringing</b>	<b>Correlation between authors' claims and religious background</b>
17.Petrovic (2008)	Explaining the reasons for political diversity in post-communist Eastern Europe.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
18.Tworzecki (2008)	Explaining the phenomenon of popular disengagement from civic and political life.	Big	West	Positive	Positive
19.Aidukaite (2009)	Reviewing literature on welfare state development in post-communist Eastern Europe.	Big	No data available	No data available	No data available
20.Koinova (2009)	Discussing the role of diasporas in post-communist democratization.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
21.Valkov (2009)	Challenging the hypothesis of cohabitation of civic engagement and democratic institutions.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
22.Ganev (2011)	Presenting new approach to the study of revenue-collection in post-communist states.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Positive
23.Rybar (2011)	Challenging the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism in the post-communist context.	Bounded	PC	Positive	Negative

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# Kapitalistische Moderne und Islam bei Max Weber und Sayyid Qutb

M. Esad Şahin

**Zusammenfassung:** In dieser Arbeit werden die von Weber und Qutb entwickelten Theorien über den Zusammenhang von moderner Gesellschaft, Kapitalismus und Islam behandelt. Damit werden zwei Perspektiven auf die kapitalistische Modernisierung diskutiert, die zueinander komplett diametral entgegengesetzt sind. Zunächst wird Webers Analyse des Verhältnisses von Religion und Kapitalismus (als der Geist des Kapitalismus) diskutiert, danach richtet sich der Blick auf Seyyid Qutbs Grundannahmen hinsichtlich der Kritik an der kapitalistischen Modernisierung. Dabei wird auch auf die politischen und sozialen Bedingungen eingegangen und seine politische Entwicklung sowie relevante Teile seiner Biographie dargestellt. Darüber hinaus werden die für sein Denken zentralen Begriffe und Konzepte vorgestellt. Zum Schluss wird skizzenhaft auf den Einfluss von Qutbs Denken auf die islamischen Gesellschaften eingegangen. Im Vordergrund steht dabei die Frage, inwieweit Qutb das islamische Denken erneuert hat und inwiefern er als der zentrale Vordenker des radikalen Islams gelten kann. Es wird auch kritisch danach gefragt, ob Qutbs Konzept den Grundsätzen des Islam überhaupt gerecht wird. Bei der Vorgehensweise wird der entscheidende Unterschied zwischen den beiden Gesellschaftsformen berücksichtigt, in denen die Arbeiten von Weber und Qutb entstanden sind: Die Entwicklung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft im Westen hat dazu geführt, dass Religion im Zuge der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen Veränderungen erlitt, während dagegen in den traditionellen Gesellschaft der islamischen Welt eine derartige gesellschaftliche Entwicklung nicht stattgefunden hat; hier ist die Gesellschaft und damit auch die Rolle der Religion stets vom Staat aus reguliert worden. Bezüglich der beiden Ansätze ist ein entscheidender Umstand zu berücksichtigen: Während Max Weber in erster Linie eine Beschreibung der historischen Entwicklung des Verhältnisses von Religion und der modernen, kapitalistischen Gesellschaft liefert, entwickelt Qutb ebenso eine Beschreibung der Religion und Moderne, aber zugleich ist sein Ansatz ein politisches Konzept. Die kritische Analyse der kapitalistischen Modernisierung im Westen hebt den Anspruch, damit auch ein alternatives Gesellschaftsmodell zu begründen.

**Schlüsselwörter:** Weber, Qutb, Religion, Gesellschaft, Islam, Modernisierung

**Abstract:** In this piece, the theories within the framework of modern society, capitalism and Islam developed by both Max Weber and Sayyid Qutb will be examined via an analysis on two perspectives on capitalist modernism that are diametrically opposed to each other. To begin with, the focus will be positioned on Weber's analysis of the relationship between religion and capitalism (or the "spirit" of capitalism). Subsequently, a look will be taken at the principle aspects of Qutb's fundamental assumptions regarding the critique of capitalist modernization. In the course of this, concepts and notions central to his thought will be outlined. Furthermore, relevant aspects of his biography will be highlighted, as well as the political and social terms that pertain to his thinking. For this part, the influence of his thoughts on Muslim societies will be addressed. The main question here is how and to what degree Qutb has been one the central thinkers trying to reform Islamic thought as well as to which degree he can be counted as one of the forefathers of Islamism. Further, it will be critically dissected if Qutb actually acts in accord to Islamic principles. In this step, the crucial difference between both forms of society, represented by Weber and Qutb, will be taken into consideration. The development of civil society in the West has lead to a calibration of matters pertaining to religion within societal evolution, while in the more traditionalist segments of the so-called „Muslim World“ such a development has never occurred in the modern sense; here, the role of religion and hence its influence on society has always been regulated by the state. Regarding both approaches another fundamental difference has to be highlighted: while Max Weber was mainly describing the historical development of relationships between religion and modern, capitalist societies, Qutb further adds his own political concept to his description of the relationship. The critical analysis of capitalist modernization in the West also asserts the claim to reason alternative societal models.

**Einleitung: Moderne Gesellschaft, Kapitalismus und Religion**

Die Beziehungen zwischen der islamischen Welt und der westlichen Welt wird von vielen Theoretikern und Philosophen bewertet. Insbesondere nach der industriellen Revolution hat der Einfluss des Westens auf die islamische Welt stetig gestiegen, was dazu führte, dass in den islamischen

Ländern die Debatten über Modernisierung zugenommen haben. Diese Debatten blieben nicht ohne Folgen für das soziale Leben, insbesondere für das Verständnis der Religion in der Gesellschaft. So ist es nicht überraschend, dass dabei zahlreiche Probleme ans Tageslicht kamen. In den traditionellen Gesellschaften hat die Religion, wie bekannt, eine überragende Rolle im gesellschaftlichen Leben. Die Modernisierungsprozesse in Technik, Industrie und Urbanisierung haben eine grundlegende Veränderung der Religion mit sich gebracht. Diese Entwicklung hat dazu geführt, dass in den modernen Gesellschaften der Stellenwert der Religion im Gegensatz zu den traditionellen Gesellschaften enorm abgenommen hat (Günay 2000: 360). Das führte zu einer wissenschaftlichen Bewertung und damit auch zur Rationalisierung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse. Neben Industrialisierung und Urbanisierung hat der Prozess der Säkularisierung die von der Religion ausgeübte Kontrolle über die Gesellschaft entscheidend verringert. Angesichts dieser Entwicklungen der westlichen Gesellschaften haben sich auch die islamischen Gesellschaften Veränderungsprozessen unterzogen (Efe 1977: 371).

Es existierenden zahlreiche theoretische Ansätze, die den Aufstieg des Kapitalismus und der modernen Gesellschaft erklären. Der Übergang von der traditionellen Gesellschaft der modernen Gesellschaft ist untersucht worden. Dabeinimmt Max Webers These von der protestantischen Moral eine besondere Stellung ein. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass Ähnlichkeiten zwischen dem Idealtypus von protestantischer Moral und dem Idealtypus des Kapitalismus bestehen, hat Weber in seinem Hauptwerk *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* sowie in den darin enthaltenen Ausführungen zur Soziologie der Religion die islamische Religion wie alle anderen Religionen in den Blick genommen. Die wichtigsten Elemente in Max Webers Islamanalyse sind seine Grundannahmen gegenüber dem Islam. Nach Weber besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Moderne, dem Kapitalismus und der protestantischen Ethik. Als Grundelemente des Kapitalismus betrachtet Weber die Verfügungsgewalt des Unternehmers über die Produktionsmittel, den freien Markt, die rationale Technik, das rationale Recht und die Organisationsrechte der Arbeiterklasse. Auch die Vorstellung einer weltlichen Askese spielt bei der Entstehung des Kapitalismus eine sehr wichtige Rolle (Syed Anwar Husein, 2004). Weber hat zur Überprüfung seiner These von protestantischer Ethik und Kapitalismus auch andere Kulturkreise in den Blick genommen. In seinen Analysen über Indien, China und den Mittleren Osten hat Weber die These vertreten, dass einzig das christliche Europa die Voraussetzungen für die Entstehung des Kapitalismus hatte.

Das Interesse an Islam unter dieser analytischen Perspektive begann erst

spät. Der britische Sozialwissenschaftler Bryan S. Turner (1974: 1f.) bemerkte dazu kritisch, dass die Soziologen bis zu jenem Zeitpunkt sich weder für den Islam interessiert noch zum Islam etwas beigetragen haben. Ferner hat die islamische Welt das Interesse des Westens kritisch betrachtet, weil es nicht hinreichend ist und zudem oftmals Vorurteile enthält. So hat Edward Said in seinem "Orientalism" (1978) argumentiert, dass die wissenschaftlichen Annahmen des Westens grundsätzlich unschlüssig und mit Vorurteilen beladen ist. Aus diesem Grund haben die meisten Denken in den islamischen Gesellschaften sich gegenüber dem Westen als Gegner positioniert. Seyyid Qutb, dessen Denken von zentraler Bedeutung für den zeitgenössischen Islam ist, ist mit seinen Schriften über den Westen in der islamischen Welt einflussreich geworden. Qutb zählt zu den wichtigsten islamischen Denkern des 20. Jahrhunderts (Turner 1974, Husein 2004, Subasi 2000). Sein Denken dreht sich um die Begriffe tevhid, metod, cahiliye, cihad, aus denen er ein grundsätzliches islamisches Denken konzipiert. Das traditionelle Islamverständnis ablehnend, definierte Qutb sein Denken als eines der radikalen Veränderung. Demnach muss der Islam in allen gesellschaftlichen Lebensbereichen bestimmend sein.

### **Max Weber: Moderne, Kapitalismus und Islam**

Max Webers 1904 veröffentlichte Studie Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus geht der Frage nach, welchen Einfluss die Religion auf nicht nicht-religiöse Sphären auswirkt. Er hat in seiner Rechtssoziologie stellte er drei Themen in den Vordergrund:

1. Die Auswirkungen der religiösen Werte auf ökonomisches Verhalten,
2. das Verhältnis zwischen den sozialen Schichten und religiösen Ideen,
3. die Werte der westlich-abendländischen Kultur (Kurt 2010: 4)

In diesem Zusammenhang hat sich Weber mit dem Islam befasst. Dabei hat er aber den Islam nicht als Religion analysiert, sondern als ein dem Kapitalismus entgegengesetztes Wertesystem. Dass Weber den Islam in Die protestantische Ethik entwickelte Argumentation als eine soziologische Richtschnur benutzt hat, ist offenkundig. Damit die westliche Rationalität

klar gezeigt werden kann, hat Weber den Islam als Gegenbeispiel verwendet. (Husein, 2004)

Weber verwendet die Marxistische These von gesellschaftlichem Unterbau und Überbau in umgekehrter Form. Anders als Marx, der die politischen und kulturellen Werte als ein Spiegelbild des ökonomischen Unterbaus ansieht, geht Weber davon aus, dass religiöse Werte das ökonomische Bewusstsein erzeugt haben (Kurt 2010: 4). Es besteht zwischen dem Kapitalismus, dessen Entstehungsphase ins 16. Jahrhundert zurückreicht, und der protestantischen Moral eine innige Beziehung. Die protestantische Grundannahme, dass Arbeit ein Gebot Gottes sei, hat bei der Verweltlichung des Kapitalismus einen entscheidenden Anteil gehabt (Weber, 1985: 155-181).

Webers Beschäftigung mit dem Islam erfolgt in seinem Hauptwerk *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* und den daraus ausgewählten Teilen zu Religion in dem Band *Religionsoziologie*. In dem unvollendet gebliebenen Werk Webers sind seine Überlegungen zum Islam nicht vollständig (Husein 2004: 281). Um Webers Überlegungen zum Islam zu verstehen, müssen seine Grundannahmen angesehen werden. Indem Weber die Voraussetzungen und die idealtypische Struktur des Kapitalismus aufdeckt, stellt Weber die Entwicklung der weltlichen Askese zum zentralen Wertprinzip in den Vordergrund seiner Analyse. Um die europäische Entwicklung besser zu begreifen, diskutiert Weber die Kulturen Indiens, Chinas und des Nahen Ostens (Husein, 2004). Bei den außereuropäischen Religionen kann Weber die Entstehungsvoraussetzungen des Kapitalismus nicht finden. Der Islam zeichnet sich für Weber dadurch aus, dass er ein patrimoniales System ist, in dem militärische Politik im Mittelpunkt steht. Hinzu kommt, dass im Islam ein eigentümliches Verständnis von der sozialen Rolle der Frau herrscht, das Eigentum und der Luxus anders angesehen werden als in Europa, so dass im Ergebnis der Islam als ein dem Puritanismus entgegengesetztes Wertesystem darstellt. (Weber 1921 : 88f.) Weber geht sogar davon aus, dass die Verbreitung des Islam nicht durch städtische Intellektuelle vorangetrieben, sondern durch militärische Eroberung, Raub und Frauenunterdrückung erfolgt ist. Der Islam hat die Menschen, bei denen diese drei Begehren vorhanden sind, zu einer Religion vereinheitlicht und zu einem Heer gepresst (Turner 1974, 230ff. =230-243).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> „Disziplin und Glaubenskriege waren die Quelle der Unüberwindlichkeit der islamischen, ebenso wie der Cromwellschen Kavallerie“. Doch fehlen im Islam „die rationalen Elemente des ‚Weltregiments‘“, das auf innerer Weltaneignung des Einzelnen beruht, die innerweltliche Askese (Weber 1980: 347). (Georg Stauth)

Weber führt aus, dass das Selbstverständnis des Islam anders als im Christentum weder auf das Heilsversprechen noch auf die Dienerschaft gegenüber Gott gründet. Der Islam ist für ihn eine auf weltliche Bedürfnisse basierende militärisch orientierte Geistesbewegung, er ist nicht dynamisch, sondern auf Beibehaltung des Bestehenden bedacht. So ist der hervorstechende Stellenwert des materiellen Wohlergehens und Befriedigung der seelischen Bedürfnisse grundlegend für den Islam. Es ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass zwei unterschiedliche Sichtweisen auf den Islam entstanden sind: Während die eine auf den militärischen Aspekt gerichtet ist, betont die andere Sichtweise die mystische Dimension. Entscheidend ist, dass beide Dimensionen keine Voraussetzungen hervorbringen konnten, aus denen der Kapitalismus entstanden wäre (Husein, 2004).

Als einer der ersten Kritiker Webers kann Sabri Ülgener (1911-1983) gelten, der die von Weber hervorgehobene calvinistische Ethik mit der islamischen Ethik verglichen hat. Ülgener konstatierte zunächst, dass Weber die calvinistisch-puritanische Ethik als eine Arbeitsethik und der Askese von Luxus betrachtet, den Islam dagegen als eine Ethik des weltlichen Hedonismus, die der rationalen Arbeitsweise im Wege steht. Und Weber geht stets davon aus, dass der Islam stets in feudalen und halbfeudalen Gemeinschaften als eine Kultur des Konsums fortbesteht. (Weber 1972: 334f.) Der Calvinismus dagegen verfolgt Produktion und Mehrwerterzeugung in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Daher gelangt Weber zu seiner Kernthese, dass der Islam die individuelle Verantwortung nicht fördert, er erlegt dem Individuum keine Verantwortung auf bei der Förderung des Wohlstands (Ülgener 1981: 54). Die Interpretationen von Turner und Ülgener machen die Schwächen in Webers Sicht deutlich. Denn Webers Ansatz führt zu einer scharfen Trennung zwischen zwei Welten: Auf der einen Seite der Rationalismus, auf der anderen Despotie und Irrationalität. Rationales Denken, Wissenschaft, Kultur und Berufsethik und vieles mehr werden in Webers Denken zu Charakteristiken des Westens erklärt; sie sind Werte, die außerweltlichen Kulturen und Zivilisation fremd sind (vgl. Ülgener 1981: 50). In seinen Arbeiten, in denen das Verhältnis von Islam und Kapitalismus analysiert wird, weist Mahmut Arslan darauf hin, dass Weber für die ausbleibende Entwicklung des Kapitalismus in der islamischen Welt drei Faktoren sieht: Erstens der jenseitige Charakter des Sufismus passiviert das Individuum und verhindert damit, dass unternehmerisches Bewusstsein entsteht. Zweitens ist die Orientierung an militärische Eroberung eine dem kapitalistischen Bewusstsein entgegengesetzte Einstellung. Und drittens ist die politische Struktur des Despotismus, in der Eigentumsrechte und unternehmerische Freiheit unterdrückt werden. (Arslan 2000: 13)

## Kritik am Islamverständnis Webers

Eine weitreichende Kritik an Webers Islamanalyse findet sich im Werk von Bryan S. Turner. In seiner 1974 publizierten Arbeit *Weber and Islam* stellt Turner Webers These, dass der Islam eine feudale Ethik beinhalte. Turner widerspricht Webers Behauptung, im Islam hätte eine militärische Schicht die Oberhand über die Gesellschaft bekommen. Turner macht darauf aufmerksam, dass der Islam eine urbane Kultur hervorgebracht, zu deren wesentlichen Grundzügen auch der Handel gehört. Seine These kann Turner mit Beispielen unterstützen. Die Stadt Mekka, die Heiligenstätte der islamischen Welt, befindet sich auf dem Handelsweg, der das Mittelmeer mit Indien verbindet. Der Stamm von Muhammed, die Kureys, ist zwar eine wichtige politische Kraft gewesen, aber seine Angehörigen waren wichtige Händler der Region. Muhammed selbst vertrieb byzantinische Waren im Wirtschaftsraum Mekka. Auch im Koran lassen sich viele Stellen finden, in denen es um die Regelung des Handels geht. Deshalb führt Turner aus, dass in der Anfangszeit des Islam gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den in der Wüste lebenden Beduinen und den städtischen Händlern, weil die Beduinen die Handelswege bedrohten und von den Händlern Abgaben verlangten. Es war der Islam als gemeinsame Religion, die die Einheit zwischen diesen unterschiedlichen Gemeinschaften vollbracht hat, was dazu führte, dass die Muslime den Persern und Indern in eine überlegene Position gestiegen sind (Turner 1974: 237ff.). G. E. von Grunebaum (1970: 3) erinnert daran, dass Religiosität an das städtische Leben vollends angepasst wurde. Montgomery Watt (1953) betont, dass der Islam mitten in einer städtischen Handelskultur entstanden ist.

Turner geht von einem fundamentalen Fehler Webers aus. Wie Weber es auch herausgestellt hat, geht die islamische Ethik auf die Zeit um das 7. Jahrhundert in den Regionen Mekka und Medina. Darüber hinaus ging Weber davon aus, dass das patrimoniale Regime der Emeviden (die Vorfahrgeneration der Araber) fortbestanden hätte und im Osmanischen Reich fortgeführt wäre. Turner geht davon aus, dass es ein Fehler ist, diese zwei unterschiedliche Entwicklungen in ein Kausalverhältnis zu setzen. Denn in der ersten Phase des Islam hatte die Wirtschaft eine zentrale Stellung. Es waren drei Grundprinzipien verankert, die das wirtschaftliche Leben regelten: Erstens der Schutz des Eigentums, zweitens die Garantie eines Marktes, der

den Warenaustausch ermöglichte und drittens die Regelung des sozialen Verhältnisses von Reichen und Armen in Form von Maßnahmen, die eine Vergrößerung des Abstandes zwischen diesen beiden Schichten verhindern sollten. (Husein, 2004)

Eine weitere Annahme Webers, der Islam sei mit der Moderne nicht vereinbar, ist von vielen Denkern in Frage gestellt worden, die ihre Theorien im Rahmen des seit den 1960er Jahren stattfindenden Debatten zum Postkolonialismus entwickelt haben (Stauth 2006: 5). Weber geht davon aus, dass die islamischen ethischen Werte, die in ihrer Gesamtheit die Share'a bilden, von einer Kaste religiöser Gelehrter (die Ulema) entwickelt hätten, die für sich ein Monopol für die Interpretation dieser Grundsätze beanspruchen. In so einem System könne ein auf Vernunftprinzipien basierende Werteordnung nicht entwickelt werden (Stauth 2006: 4). Webers These, dass in der islamischen Kultur rationales Wissen und rationales Recht nicht entstehen kann, intensiv diskutiert. Zahlreiche Theoretiker haben diese Annahmen zurückgewiesen, weil sie der Realität nicht gerecht werden können. Bryn S. Turner beispielsweise geht davon aus, dass das Schari-Rechtssystem leistungsfähig gewesen ist. Es ist in der Lage, die Kluft zwischen Ideal und Geltung des Rechts zu schließen, etwas was nur von komplexen Instituten geleistet werden kann. Das realisiere Webers Auffassung vom islamischen Recht nicht, vor allem die Annahme, der Islam sei unter sozialem Gesichtspunkt zurückgeblieben sei nicht zufriedenstellend. Weber gibt an, dass bei der Entstehung des Kapitalismus in England das Recht diese Entwicklung entscheidend gefördert und geprägt hat, aber diese Verbindung von Recht und Kapitalismus auch für England nicht zwangsläufig sein muss, in deren Worten: auch in England hätte sich der Kapitalismus ohne das rationale Recht entwickeln und etablieren können. Die Verbotsregeln im Islam (allen voran das Zinsverbot) waren nicht so rigoros, so dass dadurch der Handel beeinträchtigt worden wäre. Der politische Faktor, der für die Verbreitung des Handels entscheidend war, war das patrimoniale System, das in der ersten islamischen Zeit und danach im Osmanischen Reich bestimmend war (Turner, 1974: 238).

## **Das politische Denken Seyyid Qutbs: Kampf gegen die Moderne**

### **Die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Hintergründe seines Denkens**

Da Seyyid Qutbs politisches Wirken in der europäischen Öffentlichkeit nicht hinreichend bekannt ist, soll vor dem Hintergrund der die politische Geschichte Ägyptens ein Überblick auf seine politische Biographie gegeben werden, bevor seine Kritik an der westlichen Gesellschaft diskutiert wird. Diese Vorgehensweise ist für Qutbs Verständnis von Moderne und Kapitalismus erforderlich, weil er seine Gesellschaftsauffassung explizit politisch ist.

Ägypten wurde ab dem Jahre 1517, für die nächsten 400 Jahre, dem Osmanischen Reich unterstellt. Wenn es auch zu kleineren Konflikten kam, behielt das Osmanische Reich die arabische Region unter seine Herrschaft. Es war der herausragenden Bedeutung Ägyptens geschuldet, dass das Osmanische Reich dieses Land mit Sonderregelungen regierte (Von Grünebaum 1993: 66). Die sich seit dem 18. Jahrhundert etablierende Industrialisierung trieb die europäischen Staaten zur Expansion in außereuropäische Regionen, um Rohstoffvorkommen zu sichern. Im 19. Jahrhundert wurde auch Ägypten zum Objekt der europäischen Mächte, die um dessen Besitz miteinander konkurrierten. In diesem konkurrierenden Imperialismus standen meist Großbritannien und Frankreich gegenüber. Frankreich hatte erstmal im Jahre 1789 Ägypten besetzt, musste aber nach kurzer Zeit, im Jahre 1801, die Besatzung aufgeben. Von diesem Zeitpunkt wurde das Land von der Dynastie der Hanedani regiert und in diesem Zeitraum verschlechterte sich das Verhältnis zum Osmanischen Reich noch mehr. Schließlich kam es im Jahre 1883 zur Eroberung der Briten, die eine unbefristete Beherrschung des Landes proklamierten (Yılmaz 1980: 22). Unter der Herrschaft des britischen Imperialismus hat Ägypten seine Souveränität komplett verloren, seine Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur war nunmehr unter der Herrschaft Großbritanniens (Sarmış 1992: 16). Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurden auch in Ägypten Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen populär. Ende der 1920er Jahre wurde die Gemeinde der „Hasan el-Benna el-ihvanu'l Muslumin“ zunehmend präsent in der politischen Öffentlichkeit. In der ersten Hälfte der 1930er Jahre musste Großbritannien den Protesten, vor allem unter der Studentenschaft,

nachgeben und Ägypten seine Souveränität zusprechen (Yılmaz 1980: 17). Die Briten haben aber das Land nicht komplett verlassen. Als Ägypten im Jahre 1948 mit Israel einen Krieg begann, war das Land erschüttert von Unruhen, die sich gegen das Königshaus richteten. Am Ende dieser Entwicklungen wurde der Führer der Muslimbrüder, Hasan el. Benna, eingesperrt und nach seiner Entlassung erschossen, was zu erheblichen Unruhen führte. Die Proteste richteten sich sowohl gegen die faktisch bestehende britische Herrschaft des Landes und gegen den König Faruk. Angesichts der lang anhaltenden Turbulenzen ergriff eine Gruppe junger Offiziere, angeführt von dem Offizier Nasir, die Regierungsmacht. König Faruk wurde abgesetzt und die Republik ausgerufen (Yılmaz 1980: 25). Die junge Republik unterzeichnete ein Abkommen mit Großbritannien und so wurde Ägypten schließlich im Jahre 1956 unabhängig. Diese lange Entwicklung in die Unabhängigkeit hat dazu geführt, dass in Ägypten zahlreiche herausragenden Persönlichkeiten die politische Bühne betraten (Sarmış 1992: 18).

## **Biographie**

Seyyid Qutb wurde 1906 in der Stadt ägyptischen Stadt Asyut geboren. Seine schulische Laufbahn absolvierte er hauptsächlich in Kairo, wo er auch studiert hat. Nach einem erfolgreichen Studium begann er eine schriftstellerische Laufbahn. Seine ersten Schriften erschienen in der Tageszeitung el-Ahram, während er begann in der Stadt Dimyat als Lehrer zu arbeiten. Nachdem er in zahlreichen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften zahlreiche Artikel veröffentlichte, zog er mit seinem Aufsatz „et- Tasviru'l- Fenni fi'l Kur'an“ die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit auf sich (Tağıyev 2010: 47; Damir-Geilsdorf 2003: 19ff.). Seine Ideen zur islamisch-politischen Ideologie machte er erstmals mit seiner am 7. Oktober 1946 erschienenen Artikel „Medarisu li's-Suht“ der Öffentlichkeit bekannt. In diesem an alle Muslime gerichteten Aufsatz kritisierte er die ägyptische Gesellschaft scharf und rief die Muslime dazu auf, sich den gesellschaftlichen Problemen zu stellen. 1948 kam eines seiner wichtigsten Werke, „el Adaletu'l- Ictimaiyye fi'l-Islam“ heraus. Darin vertritt er die These, dass die Gerechtigkeit, nach der sich die Menschheit sehnt, vom Islam verwirklicht werden kann (Sarmış 1992: 30). Qutb erhielt 1949 ein Stipendium für ein Promotionsstudium in den USA. Nach seiner Rückkehr aus den USA publizierte er gleich sein Buch „Islam und die Probleme

der Zivilisation“. Während seiner Zeit in den USA wurde der Anführer der Muslimbrüder, Hasan el-Benna, ermordet. Wenn er auch zu der Zeit nicht in der Nähe zu den Muslimbrüder stand, erlebte er, dass die Todesnachricht des islamischen Führers in der US-Öffentlichkeit mit Freude aufgenommen wurde. Dieses Ereignis war für Qutb entscheidend. Nach seiner Rückkehr aus den USA betätigte er sich in den Reihen der Muslimbrüder (Yılmaz 1980: 68). Als die Muslimbrüder für einen fehlgeschlagenen Mordanschlag auf Cemal Abdunlasir verantwortlich erklärt wurden, wurde auch Qutb verhaftet. Er blieb im Gefängnis von 1954 bis 1964. Nach seiner Entlassung wurde er wegen der Betätigung zum bewaffneten Umsturz erneut verhaftet und zum Tode verurteilt. Das Urteil wurde am 29. August 1966 vollstreckt.

### **Politische Laufbahn und die Muslimbrüder**

Trotz der entschieden politischen Positionierung hat Qutb darauf geachtet, dass nicht die politische Betätigung, sondern die geistige Entwicklung im Mittelpunkt seiner Betätigung stand (Tağıyev 2010: 49). Seine politische Laufbahn begann er in den Parteien el-Vefa und es-Sa'diyyin, und mit seinem Eintritt zu den Muslimbrüder wurde er von Beginn an eine einflussreiche Figur (Damir-Geilsdorf 2003: 28ff; Sarmış 1992: 117). Nach der Rückkehr aus den USA trat Qutb, wie bereits erwähnt, der Organisation der Muslimbrüder offiziell bei. Er übernahm gleich die einflussreiche Position der Redaktion ein. Wie er dies selbst erwähnt hat, fand er in dieser Organisation das Islamverständnis, das er selbst propagierte (Yılmaz 1980: 118).

Um Qutbs politisches Denken begreifen zu können, muss auch die politische Ideologie der Muslimbrüder berücksichtigt werden. Die Organisation der Muslimbrüder wurde 1928 durch die Initiative von Hasan el-Benna mit der Beteiligung von weiteren sechs Personen gegründet. In der Anfangszeit konzentrierte sich die Organisation auf erzieherische und bildungspolitische Aufgaben. In den 1930 begann sie jedoch, gesellschaftspolitisch aktiv zu werden, was von nun an ihren politischen Schwerpunkt bilden sollte (vgl. Metzger 2000: 46ff.; Manko 2004). Ihr Begründer Hasan el-Benna war eine charismatische Persönlichkeit. Er konnte in kurzer Zeit eine hohe Anzahl der Organisation schaffen. Die politische Zielsetzung war unmissverständlich die Revolutionierung von Gesellschaft und Staat in Richtung islamischer Ordnung (vgl. Ranko 2004: 17ff.). Die grundlegenden Ziele der Bewegung waren die

Befreiung der islamischen Welt von der Imperialistischen Herrschaft, die Etablierung einer freien und gerechten islamischen Gesellschaft, Schaffung der Einheit aller muslimischer Gesellschaften und die weltweite Verbreitung und Propagierung des Islam (Sarmış 1992: 33).

Nach dem rasanten Anstieg ihrer Anhängerschaft verlegte die Organisation ihre Zentrale von Islamiyye nach Kairo. Hasan el-Benna erklärte im Jahre 1936, dass die Organisation eine grundlegende Reform der Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung durchführen würde. Mit ihren auflagenstarken Publikationen und Pamphleten wurde die Organisation zunehmend stärker. Sie war im Besitz von zahlreichen Schulen, Moscheen und anderen Institutionen, sie war jetzt in der Lage in andere arabischen Länder zu expandieren (Eliaçık 2002: 166). Insbesondere in Syrien, dem Libanon, Palästina, Marokko und Tunesien wurde sie zunehmend politisch einflussreich (Watt 1997: 87). Die Muslimbrüder-Organisation hatte ihren Anteil in den 1930er Jahren einsetzenden Unruhen in Ägypten. Ihre Politik richtete sich zunächst gegen die britische Vorherrschaft, dann gegen den König. Bei dem Umsturz der jungen Offiziere im Jahre 1952 waren die Muslimbrüder auch beteiligt (Sarmış 1992: 34). Aber das neue Regime, das aus dem Militär bestand, stellte sich gegen die Muslimbrüder, was zu einem bewaffneten Konflikt zwischen den beiden Kräften geführt hat. Die Organisation der Muslimbrüder wurde für den Anschlag auf Abdulnasir im Jahre 1954 verantwortlich gemacht. Sie wurde verboten und viele ihrer Mitglieder verhaftet. Als Redaktionsleiter der Organisation hatte Seyyid Qutb eine aktive Rolle in diesem Prozess gespielt. Mit zahlreichen Artikel legte er den Standpunkt der Organisation dar. Aufgrund seiner publizistischen Tätigkeit wurde Qutb verhaftet und zu 15 Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt. Während seiner 10 Jahre dauernden Haft hat Qutb ununterbrochen geschrieben. Eine seiner wichtigsten Arbeiten, *Fi Zilal*, eine Kraninterpretation, wurde während seiner Haft verfasst. Nach seiner Haft musste Qutb in Hausarrest weiter leben. In dieser Zeit entstand die Arbeit *Mealim fi't-Tarik*. Darauf hin wurde er wieder verhaftet und wegen angeblicher umstürzlerischer Triebe angeklagt. Alle seine Arbeiten wurden verboten, auch Personen, die sie lasen oder verbreiteten wurden ebenfalls zu Gefängnisstrafen verurteilt (Sarmış 1992: 40). Am Ende der Anklage wurde Qutb und seine zwei Freunde zu Tode verurteilt. Das Urteil wurde am 22. August 1966 vollstreckt. Die Hinrichtung löste Proteste in islamischen Ländern aus.

## **Tevhid, Cahilliye, Cihad - Qutbs zentrale Begriffe**

Wortwörtlich bedeutet „Tevhid“ die islamische Weltanschauung. Qutb zufolge ist der Islam als Religion eine Weltanschauung (vgl. Soffar 2004; Kinik 2005: 81). Diese weltanschaulichen Grundsätze gelten demnach nicht nur für die Anhänger Muhammeds, sondern auch für die anderen beiden Offenbarungsreligionen. Qutb geht davon aus, dass zwischen der Lebzeit Muhammeds und den Perioden danach gravierende Unterschiede gibt. Die islamischen Gesellschaften nach Muhammed haben mit der ersten islamischen Gemeinde keine Gemeinsamkeit, weil sie sich stark verändert und deformiert haben (Qutb 1988: 106f = 106–128). Der Islam befindet sich Qutb zufolge im ständigen Kampf mit Abweichungen an den eigenen Reihen und den Überresten vom Paganismus. Die islamische Weltanschauung besteht darin, den Islam in den Mittelpunkt des menschlichen Lebens zu stellen. Die islamischen Bewegungen müssen diejenigen bekämpfen, die sich dem entgegenstellen (Seyyid Qutb 1988: 130). Im Zentrum der von Qutb konzipierten islamischen politischen Ideologie steht die These, dass die Souveränität nur dem Gott zukommen dürfe. Nur dem Gott zuordnenden Schariat-Rechtsregeln dürfen Gültigkeit haben (Qutb 1988: 146). Diejenige Gesellschaftsordnung, in der dies nicht befolgt wird, also in ihr eine andere Souveränitätskonzeption herrscht und andere Rechtsregeln als das Schariat gültig sind, bezeichnet Qutb die „Cahilliye“. Mit diesem Begriff waren bis dahin die vorislamischen Gemeinschaften bezeichnet, die als Gemeinwesen verworfen wurden.<sup>21</sup> Auch Qutb verwendet diesen Begriff, um die nicht-orthodoxen Konzeptionen islamischer Gemeinschaft zu verwerfen. Allerdings hatte die ursprüngliche Verwendung den Sinn die islamische Gesellschaft, in der es eine Aufklärung stattgefunden hatte, von der vorangegangenen Gemeinschaft zu unterscheiden, in der es irrationale Regeln und Orientierung geltend waren. Die gesellschaftstheoretische Brisanz von Kubus Vorgehensweise besteht darin, dass er alle nicht-islamischen Gesellschaften als unter diese Kategorie fasst (vgl. dazu Kayacan 2006: 3).

Qutb begreift die Cahilliye als eine Ordnung, in der der Mensch von dem Menschen versklavt ist (Seyyid Qutb, 1980: 101ff. ; siehe Damir-Geilsdorf 2003: 85ff.). Damit wird der Gerechtigkeitssinn in der ganzen

<sup>21</sup> Im Koran heißt es: „Wünschen sie etwa die Rechtsprechung (aus den Tagen) der Unwissenheit zurück? Und wer ist ein besserer Richter als Allah für ein Volk, das fest im Glauben ist?“ (5. Sure, 50. Verse).

Argumentation deutlich. Dieser Mangel gerechter Ordnung charakterisiert die Calliye in zweifacher Hinsicht: Die Menschen und Gesellschaften, die in Cahilliye verfallen sind, sind entweder Ungläubige oder Sünder. Während die Gemeinschaft der Sünder ein Gottesgebot nicht umsetzt, zeichnet sich die Gemeinschaft der Ungläubigen dadurch aus, dass sie sich den Gottesregeln widersetzen und ihre eigenen Normen als überlegen betrachten (vgl. Qutb 1980: 38, siehe auch: Kayacan 2006: 3).

Der Kampfbegriff des Cahilliya wird verständlich wenn er im Verhältnis zu dem des Cihad gesehen wird. Der umstrittenste Begriff in der islamischen Literatur ist vermutlich der des Cihad. Er hat allerdings zwei Bedeutungen: Er beschreibt zum einen den Kampf gegen die Nicht-Muslime, zum anderen in der islamischen Mystik die Erziehung zum Gerechten (Loboda: 19f. ; Özel 527; Tagiyev 115).<sup>22</sup> In beider Hinsicht macht der Chihad-Begriff die Militanz der politischen Theorie und Praxis von Qutb deutlich. Die von ihm und seiner Organisation propagierte Politik zielte unmissverständlich auf die Beseitigung der Staatsordnung ab - und zwar nicht nur der ägyptischen, sondern aller arabischen Länder.

### **Kritik der modernen Gesellschaft**

Diese Kritik richtet sich zwar gegen den ägyptischen Staat, aber sie ist allgemeiner Natur: Qutb geht es um eine vollständige Ablehnung der kapitalistischen und liberalen Moderne als Gesellschafts- und Staatssystem. Die politische Position ist gerade deshalb derart zugespitzt, weil sie eine komplette Umgestaltung der gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Verhältnisse bezweckt. Qutb will mit seiner extrem politisierten Islaminterpretation eine radikale Umwälzung der Gesellschaft. Das ist allerdings ein Versuch, nicht, wie im Sozialismus, ein auf die Zukunft projiziertes Ziel (z.B. Utopie) zu verwirklichen, sondern das Gegenteil davon zu bewirken: Erstrebt wird eine historische Rückwärtsbewegung. Die mit der europäischen Gesellschaft

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<sup>22</sup> Die entsprechende Sure im Kuran besagt: „Ihr, die den Iman verinnerlicht habt! Führt den bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Kafir, die in eurem unmittelbaren Umkreis sind, und sie sollen von euch Härte erfahren. Und wisst, daß ALLAH gewiß mit den Muttaqi ist.“ (9. Sure, 123. Verse) Damit wird Seyyid Qutbs Cihad-Verständnis begreiflich. Ihm zufolge muss der Weg des Islam befolgt werden. Mit weiteren Hinweisen auf entsprechenden Stellen in anderen Suren, weist Qutb darauf hin, dass der Weg des Cihad sehr mühsam ist, aber deren Vorteile nicht nur den Muslimen, sondern der gesamten Menschheit zugute kommen würden. Qutb begreift den Cihad als eine Methode der inneren Erziehung (vgl. Fi Zilal, 1.Volumen, 461ff.).

entstandenen gesellschaftlichen, moralischen und politischen Entwicklungen werden verworfen - und ihre Expansion in die arabisch-islamischen Länder sollen wieder rückgängig gemacht werden.

In den folgenden Abschnitten sollen nun die Einzelheiten von Qutbs Projekt der islamistischen Alternative zur Moderne dargestellt werden. Es darf nicht vergessen werden, dass diese Ablehnung in dem gesellschaftlichen Kontext der Modernisierung der arabischen Länder erfolgt. Die Verwerfung der Moderne als geschichtliche Entwicklung ist also sehr konkret, sie dient zur Verurteilung des Modernisierungsparadigmas in den arabischen Ländern.

Seine Kenntnisse über die moderne Gesellschaft gewann Qutb zunächst mit seinem Aufenthalt in den USA (von 1948 bis 1950) und seiner Lektüre der europäischen Theorien. Im Mittelpunkt seines Moderneverständnisses steht die These, dass der Westen und seine Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung, also die Moderne, dem Islam gegenüber feindlich eingestellt sind. Umgekehrt müssten auch die Muslime sich dem Westen, seinen sozialen Grundsätzen wie materielle Interessenverfolgung oder Säkularisierung gegenüber feindlich einstellen (Murat 2006: 5). Qutb unterstützte seine Argumente mit seinen Beobachtungen in den USA. Als negative moderne Lebensweise griff er das Geschlechterverhältnis an, ebenso das Zinssystem, den Alkoholkonsum, die Atomisierung der Einzelnen und den Rassismus. In den Mittel seiner Modernitätskritik stellte Qutb die Verwerfung der Säkularisierung. Die Abtrennung der Religion von der Gesellschaft hätte zur Kälte und Entfremdung in den menschlichen Verhältnissen geführt. Als Orientierung für das Leben hält Qutb den Koran und die Gebote des Propheten für unverzichtbar. An die Muslime adressiert er, dass sie westliche Modernisierung und Aufklärung ablehnen müssen (Thameem Ushama, 2005).

Eine zweite Stütze der anti-westlichen Haltung Qutb bildet die Ablehnung des westlichen Imperialismus und Kolonialismus. Der Umstand, dass Ägypten über lange Zeit hinweg unter Fremdherrschaft gestanden hatte, hatte zu Lebzeiten Qutbs die Öffentlichkeit in dieser Hinsicht sensibilisiert. Qutb hält den Islam als die einzig geeignete Weltanschauung, die beim Kampf um Unabhängigkeit Orientierung bieten kann. Jede nicht-islamische Ordnung begünstigt nach Qutb Fremdherrschaft unter den Menschen. Im Islam dagegen steht die Souveränität dem Gott zu, während die Menschen in Freiheit leben (Qutb 1980: 6; Murat 2006: 10). Hatte der Kapitalismus zu seinen Anfangszeiten den Anspruch gehabt, die feudalen Abhängigkeiten zu beseitigen, so hat er aber inzwischen die Werte vernichtet, die dem Menschen

Orientierung gaben und eine Ordnung errichtet, in der es kein Platz für Gerechtigkeit ist. Es hatte eine Entfremdung zwischen den Bürgern und dem Staat eingetreten. Aus diesen Gründen stellt der Kapitalismus ein Gegenmodell zur islamischen Ordnung dar (Qutb 1980: 6)

Es ist folglich zu konstatieren, dass Qutb eine gänzliche andere Perspektive einnimmt bei seiner Bewertung der westlichen/europäischen Gesellschaftsentwicklung, d.h. der kapitalistischen Moderne als Weber. Der entscheidende erkenntnistheoretische Unterschied zu Weber liegt darin, dass hier die Moderne keine evolutionäre geschichtliche Entwicklung darstellt, sondern ein politisches Projekt ist, das beliebig gesteuert und sogar beendet werden kann. Die politisierte Weltanschauung lässt keinen Raum für eine historisch-theoretische Behandlung des Themas der kapitalistischen Moderne und der mit ihr verbundenen sozialen Problemen, die nicht nur von Qutb, sondern auch von zahlreichen Denkern und Theoretikern zur Sprache gebracht worden sind.<sup>23</sup>

Bei Qutb und Weber sind also zwei methodisch diametral entgegengesetzte Vorgehensweisen zu finden. Bezüglich Weber muss aber festgestellt werden, bei ihm eine einseitige, positivistische Darstellung erfolgt, in der die negativen Folgen ausgeblendet werden (Armut, Entfremdung, Naturzerstörung), und auch die politische Seite der Modernisierung (politische Gewalt in den kapitalistischen Ländern selbst und Kriegsführung in den nicht-europäischen Regionen) wird von ihm nicht thematisiert.

## **Schluss und Ausblick**

Im ersten Teil wurde Max Webers Überlegungen hinsichtlich der Unvereinbarkeit von Kapitalismus und Islam diskutiert. Ferner wurde diskutiert, welche Aspekte der islamischen Religion der westlichen Werbetradition widersprechen. Die Islaminterpretation von Seyyid Qutb, der die späteren Generationen radikaler Islamisten prägte, bestätigt Webers These. Wie das am Beispiel Qutb deutlich wird, ist der radikale Islam mit der

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<sup>23</sup> Eine kritische Darstellung der kapitalistischen Entwicklung lässt in sehr vielen westlichen Theorien zu finden. Als Klassiker können, neben unzähligen marxistischen Ansätzen, vor allem Adorno/Horkheimer, Heidegger (Sein und Zeit) und Foucault genannt werden. Die negativen Folgen von Technologie und Kapitalismus wird auch in der soziologischen Theorie kritisch behandelt, so etwa bei Ulrich Beck (Die Risikogesellschaft) und Richard Sennett (Der flexible Mensch).

Modernisierung nicht vereinbar. Allerdings existieren andere Interpretation des Verhältnisses von Islam, Politik und Gesellschaft. Auf sie wird weiter unten hingewiesen. Hier sollen zunächst die Ergebnisse des Vergleichs von Qutbs Ideen mit Max Webers Islamauffassung zusammenfassend diskutiert werden. In Qutbs radikal politischen Interpretation zeigt sich der Islam in der Tat als eine Religion, die nicht auf das Innerliche bezogen ist, sondern, vorrangig auf Strukturierung der Gesellschafts- und Staatsordnung abzielt. Webers Annahme, dass diese geistigen Werte im Islam nicht anzutreffen sind, wird auch von Qutb bestätigt. Qutbs Ablehnung der westlichen Werte geht soweit, dass er den Dialog mit der gesamten abendländischen Geistesgeschichte ablehnt. Was Qutb will ist ein Neubeginn, der alles was vor dem Koran und Mohammed entstanden ist, als Wertgrundlage nicht berücksichtigt. Verworfen wird nicht nur die europäische Neuzeit, sondern auch die griechische Antike. Damit lehnt Qutbs radikale Interpretation des Islam auch die meisten islamischen Denktraditionen ab; denn der Islam war mit dem Abendland in seiner Frühphase mit dem Abendland im Dialog, wenn etwa die griechischen Philosophen von islamisch-arabischen Denkern rezipiert worden. Qutbs ‚reine Lehre‘ des Islam soll alle Einflüsse der christlichen Metaphysik abwehren und sich ausschließlich an Koran orientieren. Die Hintergrundannahme dabei ist, dass die menschliche Vernunft niemals hinreichend sein wird, das menschliche Zusammenleben gestalten. Erst indem die im Koran enthaltenen Grundsätze und Normen zum Wertefundament der Gemeinschaft erklärt werden, können die Menschen ihre Verhältnisse friedfertig und gerecht regeln. Die menschlichen Vernunft wird von Qutb nicht gänzlich abgelehnt, im Gegenteil, er bejaht deren Förderung in der westlichen Zivilisation; er unterstreicht allerdings gleichzeitig seine Annahme, dass die Vernunft, entgegen dem Fortschrittsglauben der westlichen Geisteshaltung (Positivismus) nicht in der Lage sei, die Missstände und das Böse zu verhindern. Der Positivismus habe dazu geführt, dass in der Gesellschaft nur das Materielle sinnstiftend sei. Diese auf positivistischen Materialismus aufgebaute Zivilisation muss Qutb zufolge aufgelöst und durch eine auf den Koran den Geboten Muhammeds aufbauende Ordnung ersetzt werden. Angesichts dieser totalen Ablehnung der westlichen Tradition überrascht es nicht, dass der Kapitalismus als ein System begriffen wird, das sich auf das menschliche Zusammenleben destruktiv auswirkt. Dass auch die anderen ökonomischen Systeme, die zu seiner Zeit existierten, gesellschaftlich destruktiv gewesen sind, wird von Qutb nicht thematisiert.

Qutb konzentriert sich stattdessen vollends auf die Kritik am westlichem Kapitalismus und propagiert den Islam als die alleinige Ordnungsgrundlage, für deren Verwirklichung er den Cihad als gerechtfertigt ansieht - dabei

begreift er den Cihad nicht als einen inneren Kampf um den rechten Glauben, wie viele andere islamische Gelehrte es sehen, sondern als politische und gewaltförmige Bekämpfung des westlichen Gesellschaftsmodells. Auch wenn er betont, dass mit dem Islam ein Zustand erreicht werden soll, in dem Weltfrieden und Gerechtigkeit erreicht werden soll, haben seine Ideen die späteren Generationen des radikalen Islam erheblich beeinflusst. Insbesondere nach dem 11. September 2001 hat Qutb die Aufmerksamkeit vieler westlicher Intellektueller auf sich gezogen, die ihm vorwerfen, ein totalitärer Vordenker zu sein, der nun zum geistigen Führer des gegenwärtigen islamischen Terrorismus geworden ist. (Brogen 2003: 1-6.)

Qutb lässt keinen Spielraum für einen gesellschaftlichen Diskussionsprozess, mit dem ein angemessenes Verhältnis von Islam und gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt zu finden wäre, wie dies im Modernisierungsprojekt in der Türkei in den späten 1920er Jahren begonnen wurde und eine paradigmatische Bedeutung bezüglich der Reformierung des Islam hat. Qutb verurteilt dieses Reformmodell, das mit dem Namen Kemal Atatürk verbunden, scharf. Mit seiner radikalen Interpretation bestätigt Qutb Weber, dass der Islam zur kapitalistischen Moderne nicht passt.

Der radikale Islam, den Qutb entscheidend geprägt hat, hatte die Säkularisierung in den islamischen Ländern bekämpft. Der Islam war zweigeteilt: Es standen sich ein säkularer Islam (repräsentiert von der Türkei und den nationalen Modernisierungsbewegungen in den arabischen Ländern) und der Islamismus, der die Modernisierung als Konzept und die sich darauf berufenden arabischen Regime bekämpfte. Nun gibt es aber ein Islamverständnis, das die kapitalistische Moderne nicht ablehnt und sich von dem höchst politisierten radikalen Islam, der die Feindschaft gegen den Westen in ihrem Mittelpunkt hat, abgrenzt. Es hat sich ein Reformislamismus (hauptsächlich in der Türkei), der die politische Feindschaft des Radikalismus verwirft und den ökonomischen Wohlstand als Schwerpunkt hat (siehe Yavuz 2003: 97ff., 186ff.; Casanova 2006). Dieser reformislamischer Calvinismus folgt der von Weber analysierten westlichen Entwicklung und geht davon aus, dass eine islamische Wirtschaftsethik das leisten kann, was Weber der protestantische Ethik attestierte: die Erneuerung der islamischen Zivilisation durch unternehmerisches Bewusstsein und Arbeitsethik.

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**DODATAK**

# Lo spettro della pace di Belgrado nella "Rimostranza alla corte di Roma" di Joseph Maria von Thun-Hohenstein (1742)

**Marco Cassioli**

**Riassunto:** L'articolo si propone di mettere in evidenza l'impatto che il trauma della pace di Belgrado (1739) ebbe sui linguaggi della diplomazia asburgica negli anni immediatamente successivi alla firma del trattato, più precisamente durante la guerra di successione austriaca (1740-1748). L'analisi si concentra su un documento poco noto, conservato in copia presso l'Archivio di Stato di Torino: la "Rimostranza alla corte di Roma" (1742) di monsignor Joseph Maria von Thun-Hohenstein, inviato di Maria Teresa d'Asburgo presso la corte pontificia. Dal testo emerge come il timore di insurrezioni in Ungheria e Transilvania fosse in qualche modo legato alle recenti perdite territoriali subite dalla Casa d'Austria e sancite, appunto, dalla pace di Belgrado. L'entità di queste perdite, che includevano il nord della Serbia, è misurata attraverso un memoriale del tardo Seicento, anch'esso rinvenuto a Torino, il quale mette in luce i progetti asburgici volti a trasformare Belgrado in una piazzaforte contro l'Impero ottomano e in un grande centro commerciale tra Oriente e Occidente. Il testo della "Rimostranza" è presentato in Appendice.

**Parole chiave:** diplomazia asburgica, guerra di successione austriaca, corte pontificia, Ungheria, Transilvania, Casa d'Austria, Serbia, Belgrado, Impero ottomano.

Il 25 maggio 1742 monsignor Joseph Maria von Thun-Hohenstein (1713-1763), inviato della regina Maria Teresa di Ungheria presso la corte

pontificia, inoltrava al segretario di Stato di Sua Santità, cardinale Silvio Valenti Gonzaga, un'accesa "Rimostranza" in cui, oltre a lamentare le atrocità commesse in Austria dalle truppe di altri Paesi cattolici, quali la Francia e la Baviera, denunciava un complotto internazionale volto a sottrarre l'Ungheria e la Transilvania al controllo asburgico. Anima del complotto sarebbe stato il cardinale André-Hercule de Fleury, principale ministro di Stato di Luigi XV<sup>24</sup>.

Non era la prima volta che al diplomatico in veste talare toccava un compito così gravoso. Figlio del conte Jacob Joseph Anton von Thun-Hohenstein e della contessa Margarethe Veronica, Joseph Maria era divenuto, giovanissimo, canonico di Salisburgo e di Passavia. Dal 1739 al 1744 visse a Roma, quale uditore (giudice) presso il Tribunale della Rota Romana (Sacra Rota) e inviato di re Carlo III di Ungheria, poi di sua figlia Maria Teresa, presso la Santa Sede. Il 18 febbraio 1742 papa Benedetto XIV, al secolo Prospero Lambertini<sup>25</sup>, lo aveva consacrato vescovo di Gurk, ufficio che ricoprì fino al 1761, quando fu elevato a principe vescovo di Passavia<sup>26</sup>. Il 24 febbraio 1742, pochi giorni dopo la detta consacrazione, egli aveva presentato al segretario di Stato una memoria in cui gli chiedeva di fare in modo che il papa ritardasse il più possibile il riconoscimento di Carlo Alberto di Baviera a imperatore del Sacro Romano Impero. L'elezione di Carlo Alberto, alleato della Francia, era infatti contestata dalla regina di Ungheria, la quale aveva brigato affinché diventasse imperatore il proprio marito, Francesco Stefano di Lorena<sup>27</sup>. Alla nota di monsignor von Thun-Hohenstein, il cardinale Valenti Gonzaga aveva risposto con un mordace biglietto, datato 14 marzo 1742, nel quale gli rinfacciava di avere distribuito copia della sua memoria a ministri stranieri e gli suggeriva di riflettere a mente lucida sulla retta condotta del Santo Padre, che nel frattempo aveva riconosciuto l'elezione imperiale<sup>28</sup>.

24 Cfr. Appendice.

25 Su questo pontefice, in carica dal 1740 al 1758, e sui suoi rapporti con la Casa d'Austria si veda ad esempio Gelmi 1987: 202-205.

26 Sulla figura di Joseph Maria von Thun-Hohenstein si vedano Reusch 1894 e Auer 1974.

27 Mandrou 1978: 274.

28 La risposta del segretario di Stato si chiude con queste parole: «Tanto crede il cardinale Valenti bastare per far comparire immune di ogni censura il contegno di Sua Santità. Che, con pace di monsignore, quando vi rifletterà a sangue freddo e ponendosi ne' panni nostri, per usare quell'indifferenza che è tanto necessaria per formare un buon giudizio, certamente che gli dispiacerà di aver lasciata correre fuori delle sue mani una sì pungente e non meritata doglianza» (Archivio di Stato di Torino, Corte, Materie Politiche per Rapporto all'Estero, Corti Estere, Austria e Corti d'Allemagna, mazzo 2 prima addizione, doc. 12, 24 febbraio 1742, Memoria presentata da monsignor di Thunn, vescovo di Gurck, a nome della sua sovrana la regina Maria Teresa d'Ungheria al cardinale Valenti, segretario di Stato di Sua Santità, diretta a persuadere la corte di Roma a differire la ricognizione del nuovo eletto imperatore, colla risposta di detto segretario di Stato delli 14 successivo marzo, copia del XVIII secolo). La decisione del papa poggiava, probabilmente, su due convinzioni: che Carlo Alberto avrebbe curato gli interessi della Santa Sede e che il riconoscimento pontificio avrebbe avuto un

Ora, due mesi dopo quello scambio di convenevoli, il neoeletto vescovo di Gurk tornava alla carica con uno scritto decisamente infuocato, il quale va letto alla luce della situazione storico-politica di quegli anni, cruciali per il futuro dell'Italia e dell'Europa. Un contesto caratterizzato, sul piano internazionale, dalla guerra di successione austriaca (durante la quale l'esistenza stessa della monarchia asburgica fu messa in pericolo dalla politica aggressiva della Francia, della Spagna, della Prussia e della Baviera)<sup>29</sup> e, sullo scacchiere italiano, da una sempre maggiore presenza e ingerenza dell'Austria, la quale si faceva sentire con forza anche a Roma. Come ha scritto Dino Carpanetto, «dover far i conti in Italia con gli Asburgo voleva dire per la Curia dover fronteggiare nuove pressioni giurisdizionalistiche, che traevano spunto dalla politica austriaca e dalla tradizione ghibellina che questa animava»<sup>30</sup>. La "Rimostranza" di Joseph Maria von Thun-Hohenstein riflette pienamente questo clima e si rivela una fonte preziosa per studiare e comprendere i linguaggi della diplomazia nella prima metà del Settecento. Anche questo documento, come la memoria del 24 febbraio 1742, circolò presso ministri e corti estere: una copia di esso, trascritta in Appendice, è conservata presso l'Archivio di Stato di Torino, fra le carte riguardanti la corte austriaca. La sua presenza nella capitale sabauda testimonia l'interesse che il Regno di Sardegna, impaziente di espandersi in Lombardia, nutriva nei confronti dell'attività diplomatica che gli Asburgo conducevano ai quattro angoli dell'Europa.

Nella prima parte del testo, l'Autore denuncia con foga le violenze commesse dalle truppe francesi, bavaresi e prussiane in Austria e Moravia, ponendo l'accento sui saccheggi e le profanazioni dei luoghi sacri e sugli oltraggi subiti da sacerdoti e religiosi. Benché monsignor von Thun-Hohenstein le definisca «enormi, e fra principi cristiani non mai intese, estorsioni», esse non erano, all'epoca, così rare. Già durante la guerra dei trent'anni, i soldati cattolici del generale Tilly, che imperversavano nella diocesi di Hildesheim bruciando i villaggi, depredando ed uccidendo i contadini, violando le donne e saccheggiando le chiese protestanti, non avevano risparmiato nemmeno quelli della loro stessa confessione e nel convento di Amelungsborn avevano fatto a pezzi i paramenti sacri, fracassato l'organo, rubato i calici e saccheggiato persino le tombe delle monache (1625)<sup>31</sup>. Non bisogna però dimenticare che, nello stesso periodo in cui

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effetto distensivo, «inducendo Maria Teresa a rassegnarsi al fatto compiuto e ad aderire a quella pacificazione alla quale Benedetto XIV tendeva tutte le sue energie». Convinzioni «ben presto smentite dagli avvenimenti» (De Caro 1970: 589). Tra coloro che influenzarono la decisione papale vi fu il cardinale Francesco Scipione Borghese, rappresentante personale dell'imperatore presso la Santa Sede.

29 Wandruszka 1968: 486-493.

30 Carpanetto, Ricuperati 1990: 243.

31 Wedgwood 1964: 206

lamentava gli oltraggi subiti dai sudditi cattolici nelle terre invase dal nemico, la monarchia asburgica cercava, con l'appoggio dei gesuiti, di cattolicizzare i sudditi ortodossi della Transilvania, suscitando malcontento e agitazioni<sup>32</sup>. Su tali retroscena il vescovo di Gurk, ovviamente, tace.

A questo preambolo fa seguito la denuncia di un complotto ordito dalla Francia, di concerto con Svezia, Prussia e Impero ottomano, per sollevare contro gli Asburgo le popolazioni dell'Ungheria e della Transilvania. A reggere le fila dell'intrigo sarebbe stato, come si è detto, il cardinale Fleury, i cui disegni e scopi sono definiti, rispettivamente, «malvagi» e «inumani». Forse in mancanza di argomenti migliori, monsignor von Thun-Hohenstein non esita a servirsi di volgari pettegolezzi pur di screditare agli occhi del papa l'ultimo cardinale-ministro di Francia, oggi ricordato per il suo infaticabile zelo nel promuovere la pace<sup>33</sup>. Ciò non toglie che, durante tutta l'età moderna, la tradizionale amicizia franco-ottomana abbia rappresentato un serio problema, contribuendo a ritardare di alcuni secoli la liberazione dei Balcani. Gli altri personaggi coinvolti nella trama sarebbero stati Giorgio Rákóczi, rampollo di una nobile famiglia ungherese notoriamente antiasburgica, e il marchese Louis-Sauveur de Villeneuve, già ambasciatore di Francia a Costantinopoli. Pochi anni prima, al termine della guerra russo-turca del 1735-1739, costui era stato incaricato di condurre i negoziati fra l'Austria, alleata della Russia, e l'Impero ottomano. La sua mediazione aveva fatto sì che la pace firmata a Belgrado il 18 settembre 1739 fosse estremamente favorevole ai turchi. Questi avevano infatti riottenuto quasi tutti i territori perduti con la pace di Passarowitz (1718), vale a dire l'Oltenia, il nord della Serbia e una piccola parte della Bosnia. Solo il Banato era rimasto all'Austria<sup>34</sup>.

È lo spettro della pace di Belgrado, dunque, che aleggia sulla “Rimostranza alla corte di Roma”. A spingere l'azione diplomatica di monsignor von Thun-Hohenstein è il timore che la nuova guerra europea possa offrire ai turchi la possibilità di recuperare altri territori. Più ancora dell'Ungheria o della Transilvania, è il Banato che doveva impensierire la Casa d'Asburgo in quel delicato frangente. Qui, Vienna stava investendo notevoli risorse nella realizzazione di progetti che avrebbero favorito lo sviluppo della provincia e la sua integrazione nella Mitteleuropa, come il ripopolamento ad opera di coloni soprattutto tedeschi<sup>35</sup>.

32 Papacostea 1971: 226-228; Miron 2013

33 Sul cardinale Fleury cfr. Corradi 1987 e relativa bibliografia.

34 Wandruszka 1968: 473; Tertecel 2007: 226-227. I turchi avrebbero poi rimesso l'Oltenia alla Valacchia (Stato vassallo dell'Impero ottomano), alla quale la regione era appartenuta fino al 1718.

35 Landais 2013.

Ambiziosi piani erano stati elaborati, nei decenni precedenti, anche per la Serbia. È ciò che emerge da un memoriale all'imperatore, anonimo e non datato, conservato in copia nello stesso fondo dell'archivio torinese. Il contenuto del testo coincide con quello del manoscritto intitolato *Umilissimo ricordo a Sua Maestà Cesarea per l'Ungheria e per la Transilvania*, custodito presso la Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Esso è stato pubblicato, in traduzione romena, da Ion Dumitriu-Snagov, che lo data al 1688, attribuendolo ad un consigliere militare dell'imperatore Leopoldo I<sup>36</sup>. Tra le varie proposte formulate dall'anonimo consigliere vi è quella di trasformare Belgrado in un grande centro commerciale che funga anche da baluardo contro la minaccia turca, non appena la città fosse passata stabilmente sotto il controllo austriaco: «Le gloriose armi di Vostra Maestà potranno al piacere, colla grazia di Dio, ricuperar Belgrado, se pur Vostra Maestà manderà a tempo una buona armata sotto il comando d'un grande ed esperimentato capitano, con tutti li requisiti necessari in campagna. La situazione di detto Belgrado viene arricchita dalli fiumi Arva, Voga, Samos, Tibisco, Manisio, Grana, Tebes, Sava, Drava e da altri fiumi, i quali entrano nei sudetti e poi nel Danubio, siché non solamente quella città può esser un emporeo d'ogni sorte di mercanzie (purché s'usi diligenza d'indurre negozianti ad habitarvi, come facevano prima) et in particolare di pelli, cera, miele, drappi di seta et oro, e panni da mandar in Turchia, Valacchia, Transilvania e Bosnia con altri profitti i quali per brevità tralascio, ma se ne può fare una piazza fortissima riducendola in isola mediante il taglio per il quale corra una parte della Sava, con che la Maestà Vostra haverebbe un antemurale inespugnabile, che terrebbe in freno la potenza ottomana et in devotone la Valacchia, Transilvania, Bosnia et altre provincie»<sup>37</sup>.

Stando a questa proposta, dunque, Belgrado avrebbe dovuto diventare un "luogo centrale" ove far convergere i prodotti che dall'Europa dell'Est, o attraverso di essa, giungevano in Occidente (come le pelli, la cera, il miele, la seta, l'oro) e, allo stesso tempo, un centro di smistamento di quei panni occidentali tanto richiesti nell'area carpatico-danubiana e nei Balcani<sup>38</sup>. Il termine «antemurale», usato per definire la città in quanto baluardo contro la potenza ottomana, compare già nelle descrizioni medievali riguardanti la difesa del mondo cristiano contro gli "infedeli". Secondo Nora Berend, *this imagery seems to have had two roots: the physical defence-system used in warfare;*

36 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 8194, ff. 57r – 64v; Dumitriu-Snagov 1989; Cassioli 2015.

37 Archivio di Stato di Torino, Corte, Materie Politiche per Rapporto all'Estero, Corti Estere, Austria e Corti d'Allemagna, mazzo 6 non inventariato, Umilissimo ricordo a Sua Maestà Cesarea per l'Ungheria, paragrafo 30.

38 Sui rapporti commerciali tra l'Impero asburgico e l'Europa sud-orientale in età moderna si vedano ad esempio Căzan 2006: 315-324 e Murgescu 2012: 298-301.

*and biblical exegesis where the ‘wall and rampart’ of Isaiah 26:1 was often interpreted as a reference to faith. The two traditions came together in the imagery of the protection of Christendom against non-Christian attackers*<sup>39</sup>.

Ora, la pace siglata nel 1739 restituiva ai turchi la Serbia settentrionale, bloccando così l’attuazione di qualsiasi progetto volto al rilancio economico della città. Essa era rimasta sotto il controllo austriaco appena vent’anni a partire dal 1717, quando era stata liberata dalle truppe imperiali guidate dal principe Eugenio di Savoia. Con la perdita di Belgrado, a fungere da antemurale contro la Sublime Porta sarebbero state quelle migliaia di serbi che, in fuga dall’oppressione ottomana, trovavano rifugio nell’Impero asburgico, trasformandosi in guardie di confine: a Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) e negli altri centri della frontiera danubiana dove stava avvenendo quella rinascita culturale serba che avrebbe caratterizzato l’intero secolo XVIII<sup>40</sup>. Nella patria di adozione, tuttavia, i serbi avrebbero dovuto fare i conti con «una nuova minaccia», come l’ha definita Bruno Meriggi: «la pressione culturale e religiosa cattolica, contrastante nettamente con le loro tradizioni»<sup>41</sup>. In questo contesto, essi avrebbero dato un importante contributo alla lotta contro il progetto di unione dei sudditi ortodossi alla Chiesa di Roma, portato avanti dal governo: proprio dalla frontiera meridionale dell’Impero asburgico proveniva quel monaco serbo, Visarion Sarai, che nel 1744 avrebbe animato la reazione popolare anticattolica tra i romeni della Transilvania<sup>42</sup>. La guerra di successione austriaca si sarebbe invece conclusa, sei anni dopo la stesura della “Rimostranza”, senza che i turchi operassero alcun tentativo di riconquistare le terre ungheresi. Monsignor von Thun-Hohenstein avrebbe, nel frattempo, lasciato Roma e i travagli della diplomazia per andare ad occuparsi, finalmente, della diocesi di Gurk.

## APPENDICE

Archivio di Stato di Torino, Corte, Materie Politiche per Rapporto all’Estero, Corti Estere, Austria e Corti d’Allemagna, mazzo 2 prima addizione, doc. 16, 25 maggio 1742, *Rimostranza fatta alla corte di Roma, a nome della*

39 Berend 2002: 210.

40 Dvornik 1968, II: 51; Nouzille 2006; Judah 2009: 13-16; Pirjevec 2015: 24-28, 30-31.

41 Meriggi 1970: 73.

42 Papacostea 1971: 228; Miron 2013: 280.

*regina Maria Teresa d'Ungheria, da monsignore di Thunn, vescovo di Gurck, sovra le enormi estorsioni che si commettevano nell'Allemagna dai gallobavari in pregiudizio della stessa religione e sulla condotta poco degna del cardinale di Fleury, il quale cercava di eccitare i sudditi dell'Ungheria e della Transilvania a sollevarsi contro la medesima regina, copia del XVIII secolo (B), ms. cartaceo comprendente 3 fogli non numerati.*

Sua Maestà a la regina d'Ungheria e di Boemia, mossa in parte dall'obbligazione di protegger le chiese ed i suoi sudditi ecclesiastici, in parte dalla considerazione del bene comune della cattolica religione e cristianità, ha di tempo in tempo a me sottoscritto clementissimamente ordinato di rappresentare a Vostra Santità col più profondo rispetto ed efficacia le calamità alle quali nei b principati ecclesiastici della Westfalia ed in altri luoghi, li vescovi non solo nei loro beni, ma eziandio nelle persone, soggiacquero, come ancora l'enormi, e fra principi cristiani non mai intese, estorsioni, con barbari arresti eseguite nell'Austria dai gallo bavari, gli spogli, l'empietà, li sacrilegi, le profanazioni de' tempi<sup>43</sup>, le cattività de' sacerdoti, de' religiosi, dei nobili, le trasportazioni<sup>44</sup> degli abitanti senza differenza d'età e sesso intraprese nella Moravia da' prussiani.

Le mie lagrimevoli rappresentanze eccitarono bensì nell'animo giustissimo e pietosissimo di Vostra Santità un tal dolore ed una / (f. 1v) tale compassione che bene spesso la spinse a dichiararsi d'essere pronta a redimere perfino col proprio sangue le incredibili miserie dei fedeli ed impiegare quei mezzi più vevoli che le fossero stati suggeriti, li quali però o siano stati manchevoli della proporzionata efficacia, o impiegati appresso chi li disprezza, o di tale natura che non abbiano adeguata l'enormità dei fatti, restarono purtroppo privi del sospirato effetto, poiché di belnuovo nella Boemia si portano le esazioni ad un tal eccesso che gli ecclesiastici, come Vostra Santità sarà stata diffusamente informata dal loro agente, senza l'assistenza apostolica saranno in breve necessitati ad abbandonare la patria e le chiese alla loro cura commesse.

Ma neppure qui, Beatissimo Padre, finiscono le presenti miserie. Al cardinale di Fleuri<sup>45</sup> non bastano le guerre del settentrione e dell'Italia per opprimere ed affliggere non dico la religione e gli ecclesiastici, ma l'uman genere e per giungere agl'inumani suoi / (f. 2r) fini dimentica tutt'ad un tratto l'ormai all'Europa insupportabile prepotenza della Francia e si avvilisce verso il re di Prussia in modo che, venendo il tempo di pubblicare gli autentici documenti occultati finora dall'innata moderazione di Sua Maestà, è assai arduo il

43 Templi.

44 Deportazioni.

45 André-Hercule de Fleury (Lodève, 1653 - Parigi, 1743), vescovo di Fréjus dal 1699 al 1715, cardinale nel 1726, principale ministro di Stato dal 1726 alla morte.

pressagire se quella nazione sì disprezzante delle altre abborrirà più la maniera praticata dal cardinale col re di Prussia o se il mondo imparziale detesterà le azioni medesime. Il cardinale passa più oltre, e di tutto ciò Sua Maestà tiene in mano irrefragabili documenti, sollecita sotto titoli di religione e col mezzo della Svezia e Prussia li sudditi dell'Ungheria e Transilvania a sollevarsi contro di Sua Maestà e nonostante l'essersi più volte applicato ad animare con vari progetti la Porta ottomana alla rispettiva invasione del regno e provincia sudetta, ed in Parigi la corte comunemente si lusingasse – mi servirò de' suoi termini – *Que le Saint Père le Turc viendroit bientôt faire / (f. 2v) une diversion en faveur de la France*<sup>46</sup> abbia per l'addietro sempre ardito di negare a Vostra Santità li suoi malvagi disegni. Ora però sono questi avanzati ad un segno che non più si trattano fra ministri in segrete conferenze, né si discorre delli nascosti congressi tenuti in Parigi dal Ragozzi<sup>47</sup> coll'ambasciatore ottomano, resi molto agevoli e frequenti dalla vicinanza delle loro case, che per via del giardino avevano la comunicazione, né si parla delle visite notturne che il primo nella carrozza del secondo faceva al marchese di Villeneuve<sup>48</sup>, stato ambasciatore alla Porta, ma con atti pubblici e notori senza ribrezzo alcuno si scoprono a tutto il mondo. Il Ragozzi dopo aver mandato il fratello della sua concubina a Costantinopoli e consegnate le cose sue più preziose al ministro della Porta, intraprese li 23 del passato il viaggio a quella volta.

Questi, Beatissimo Padre, sono gli auspici sotto li quali incominciano le rivoluzioni della Germania. / (f. 3r) Queste sono le arti colle quali si stabilisce il decantato cattolico nuovo impero. Questi sono, per la Santa Sede, li primi saggi avuocaziali<sup>49</sup> del presente governo. Se gl'inscrutabili giudizi di Dio hanno permesso che di tanti scandali e sì orribili raggiri il principale autore fosse un cardinale di Santa Romana Chiesa, Sua Maestà la regina, ripiena di magnanima e cristiana fiducia, spera di viepiù ammirare l'onnipotenza de' medesimi divini giudizi nel distruggere e dileguare sì rei consigli dei suoi nemici. Se il cardinale di Fleuri e diversi principi cattolici vilipendono gli ecclesiastici e il bene della religione, essa [con] tutto rispetto ed ossequio verso Vostra Santità e la Santa Sede non si persuaderà mai che i malintenzionati possino riuscire a persuadere

46 «Che il Santo Padre il Turco [id est il sultano] avrebbe presto operato una diversione in favore della Francia».

47 Giorgio Rákóczi (Vienna, 1701 - La Chapelle-Saint-Denis, 1756), duca di Rákóc, Felsővádasz e Makovica. Figlio di Francesco II, principe di Transilvania e leader dell'ultima, grande insurrezione ungherese contro gli Asburgo prima del 1848, Giorgio visse prevalentemente a Parigi, dove compì gli studi. Nel 1742 si recò a Costantinopoli su invito del sultano, il quale sperava di servirsi di lui per riprendere il controllo dei territori che gli Asburgo avevano sottratto all'Impero ottomano.

48 Louis-Sauveur de Villeneuve (Aix-en-Provence, 1675 - Marsiglia, 1745), marchese di Forcalqueiret, ambasciatore di Francia presso la Sublime Porta dal 1728 al 1741.

49 Avvocateschi.

ad un pontefice, tanto superiore agli umani riflessi, che le strette obbligazioni dell'apostolato consistano nella inazione, indifferenza e semplice meditazione della rovina della religione, quindi / (f. 3v) Sua Maestà attende dall'incorrotta giustizia d'un Padre Commune, pubblici contrassegni dell'apostolico sdegno e disapprovazione e molto più la sospensione di tutte le grazie pontificie, le quali evidentemente concorrerebbero in pregiudizio di Sua Maestà ed in oppressione degli uni e dell'altra. Tanto essa mi comanda clementissimamente di rimostrare a Vostra Santità per suo discarico appresso l'oppressa e dall'ultimo precipizio minacciata cristianità. Li 25 maggio 1742.

<sup>a</sup> sul margine sinistro: Rimostranza di monsignor di Thunn, vescovo di Gurck, rimessa al signor cardinale segretario di Stato li 25 maggio 1742 <sup>b</sup>B: li

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